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SUMMARY
This thesis describes efficient design of tamper-resistant secure processor and cryp-
tographic memory protection model that will strength security of a computing system. The
thesis proposes certain cryptographic and security features integrated into the general pur-
pose processor and computing platform to protect confidentiality and integrity of digital
content stored in a computing system’s memory. System designers can take advantages
of the availability of the proposed security model to build future security systems such as
systems with strong anti-reverse engineering capability, digital content protection system,
or trusted computing system with strong tamper-proof protection.
The thesis explores architecture level optimizations and design trade-offs for support-
ing high performance tamper-resistant memory model and micro-processor architecture. It
expands the research of the previous studies on tamper-resistant processor design on sev-
eral fronts. It offers some new architecture and design optimization techniques to further
reduce the overhead of memory protection over the previous approaches documented in
the literature. Those techniques include prediction based memory decryption and efficient
memory integrity verification approaches. It compares different encryption modes applica-
ble to memory protection and evaluates their pros and cons. In addition, the thesis tries to
solve some of the security issues that have been largely ignored in the prior art. It presents a
detailed investigation of how to integrate confidentiality protection and integrity protection
into the out-of-order processor architecture both efficiently and securely. Furthermore, the




Recently, there is a growing interest in creating trusted, tamper-resistant systems that
combine the strength of advanced security hardware designs and secure operating systems
to fight against both software and hardware tampers on computing systems [37, 61, 60,
73, 74, 38, 77, 75]. Such silicon based security systems aim at solving various problems in
the security domain including anti-reverse engineer, virus/worm detection, system intrusion
prevention, digital content protection, software digital rights protection, software privacy,
etc. From the industry side, there have been a number of ongoing efforts that try to embed
security features into both the general purpose and application specific processor chips to
provide a safer computing environment to counter network intrusions, digital information
theft, virus, and copy right violations. These include 1) the combined industry effort of
trusted computing alliance called TCPA [4] and the related OS known as NGSCB [8] that try
to implement trust management and authentication at silicon level; 2) the industry initiative
to use security enhanced video processor to provide hardwired digital right protection on
video content called secure video processing [2]; 3) the thrust to use specially designed
digital right aware audio chip to protect copy right of music content [1]. Due to the
diversity of threat model assumptions and security requirements, it is impossible to design
a one-fit-all solution that will address all the security and digital right issues with one single
solution. A typical approach is that depending on the security goal and threat model,
hardware designers try to design a set of basic tamper proof security primitives or services
implemented at silicon level that enable system software developers and content providers
to design a proper solution that can meet the targeted security goal and effectively address
the threats. A hardware security feature or primitive that is absolutely necessary under one
threat model may not apply to other scenarios or applications that have different security
goals and threat models.
1
Some critical primitives of future security systems are memory encryption and integrity
protection that provide protection on program and data confidentiality and integrity. For
many security systems, memory encryption often lies at the center of protection. Apart
from hardware cryptography based tamper resistant systems [37, 61, 60] designed to pre-
vent physical tamper of data, memory encryption can also be used for creating security
systems where software based exploits are major concerns or constructing network security
systems to handle code injection attacks. For example, an interesting application is to use
memory encryption against remote code injection attack [15]. However, since system mem-
ory encryption and integrity protection are often components of a security system, we do
not elaborate on how to create a specific trust computing or security system for a specific
goal such as anti-reversing of military embedded systems using memory encryption in this
thesis. Such systems can be developed on top of the memory protection model and secure
processor architecture presented in this thesis.
In this thesis, we will focus on designing effective and efficient tamper proof memory
protection primitives and secure processor architecture that will strength security of a com-
puting system against a range of software and physical tamper at both system and platform
level.
The thesis deals with computing systems and consumer computing platforms that may
be subject to physical tamper. It assumes that the computing platform or system could be at
the hand of hackers and the hackers may have the knowledge and skill set to launch relatively
sophisticated physical tamper to compromise the sensitive information stored in the system
memory. The concerned attacks include memory device spoof, bus signal interception aimed
for information theft, physical memory eavesdrop, bus and device interface signal replay,
etc. These attacks often aim at defeating or bypassing digital right protection or stealing
sensitive data stored in the system memory. Counter measurements to those threats often
require tamper proof or tamper resistant hardware features or primitives such as hardware
facilitated memory encryption and integrity verification. However, The proposed protection
model is not a panacea to solve all the security issues. Particulary, the thesis does not focus
on attacks such as micro-probing directly on the die or other side-channel exploits e.g.
2
differential power analysis [70]. These attacks can be addressed by security countermeasures
at the packaging level or circuits design level [70]. Such countermeasures are general to all
the approaches that use silicon hardware to build a security system, thus orthogonal to the
study of this work.
Bearing these research targets in mind, the thesis explores many security issues, design
trade-offs, hardware design issues for implementing tamper resistant processor architecture
and memory protection model at both the platform and micro-architecture level.
1.1 Thesis Organization
In chapter 2, we will discuss the objectives and challenges of designing a tamper-resistant
memory model and computing platform. Furthermore, in the same chapter, we also describe
some related work of using silicon based solution for creating secure computing system.
In chapter 3, we describe several encryption modes applicable to memory protection and
each one’s pros and cons. Next in chapter 4 and chapter 5, we introduce two prediction
based optimization techniques that significantly reduce the latency overhead of memory
decryption. In chapter 6, we present a MACTree scheme for protecting integrity of system
memory and preventing memory replay attacks. Then in chapter 7, we introduce and
compare several approaches of integrating memory decryption and integrity verification into
high performance out-of-order processor pipeline and the consequent security implications.
Chapter 8 extends memory protection to SMP (symmetric multi-processor) shared memory
and discusses the new memory protection challenges in SMP environment. Finally, chapter
9 concludes the thesis.
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CHAPTER II
CHALLENGES: MEMORY SECURITY AND SECURE
MICRO-PROCESSOR
Depending on the types of applications, their operating environment, business model or
usage model, the requirements on content protection and the definition of security would be
different. A system that is secure or a protection measure that is sufficient for one type of
applications could bring security catastrophe when applied to a different type of applications
or used in a different environment. For example, some of the biggest security concerns for
enterprise computing may be accountability, viruses, access control, and network intrusion.
Due to the nature of enterprise computing, security is far more likely been compromised
by software based attacks or corrupted insiders than by hardware-based tampering such
as sophisticated eavesdrop attacks involving a complicated logical analyzer. However, for
consumer computing products, as indicated by the history, hardware-based tampering has
caused wide spread security breaches of the game consoles including compromising security
protection through user installed various types of hardware cheating or spoofing devices.
2.1 Applications
To give more details, we present four different application scenarios ranging from military
embedded system, game consoles, to distributed computing and examine their respective
security requirements.
First, high-tech military systems or advanced weapon systems are increasingly depen-
dent on complicated computer software. One of the many security concerns on high-tech
military application systems is that they may fall into the hand of people who are not so
trusted. If unprotected, the system along with its software can be studied to come up
counter measurement or counter system. Furthermore, un-trusted parties can reverse en-
gineer and design copied version of the system. Both are security nightmares that should
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be prevented regardless of the cost. Though self-destroy mechanism provides an alternative
solution, it is far from being reliable and robust.
Second, software piracy has haunted software industry for decades. Many solutions
have been proposed in the past to fight against software piracy. As indicated by the cases
of XBOX security breach [28], achieving software protection on consumer platform is far
more difficult than expected due to some specific attacks. One is software patching that
rips off the security component from a software application. This attack often involves
reverse-engineering and sometimes run-time de-assembling of the original software. Second,
hardware modification or device spoof such as installing a BIOS spoof device or MOD-chip to
break security protection. The third one is platform emulation. Illegal emulation violates
software right and bypasses security protection by running illegitimate copies through a
software machine emulator (for example playing a PSX game on a PC). To develop a
working emulator, it often first requires reverse-engineer of a computing platform, which
typically comprises reverse-engineer of the basic BIOS or system software.
Third, privacy and secrecy of mobile software agents and mobile data has been inten-
sively studied recently [65]. In many cases, the mobile software to be protected is not a
stand-alone process, but a piece of program, called mobile agent. How to execute a piece of
mobile code on a host machine without potentially exposing or disclosing both the software
and its data is a great challenge.
Fourth, internet based multi-player video gaming is growing rapidly. However, online
multi-player gaming since the first day of its success has been mauled by rampant, sometimes
wide spread “cheating”s [52]. Many of the cheating techniques involves reverse-engineer the
client game software, modifying either the client code or data (so called authoritative clients)
so that players using the hacked client will have advantages over others. The worst scenario
is that the hacked clients or patches can be downloaded online, which clearly jeopardizes
the entire business of online video game industry. How to prevent reverse engineer of the
game client and protect against tampering on the client game code and data is vital for this
emerging market.
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Most of the discussed security requirements can not be met by today’s computing plat-
form. Although researchers have tried to tackle some of the security requirements through
software based protection, the solutions are not tamper-proof and far from being satisfac-
tory. They often leave security holes to the well-knowledged hackers who can break the
protection through either hardware based physical tamper or software reverse engineering.
It is important to point out that the best practice of security hardware design is not
to come up specific hardware features for each type of application, but to find out a set of
basic security components behind the diversified security requirements. These basic security
components can be implemented as trusted hardware security primitives. Various domain
or application specific security requirements can be enforced through proper combination
or usage of these trusted hardware security primitives.
2.2 Threat Model
Physical tamper is a great threat to digital content confidentiality or integrity if can be
launched. It is in general not possible to protect a computing device from physical tamper
using pure software based solutions. Often some security measures have to be imbedded
at hardware level. Such solution is justified only when physical attack is a real threat to
data confidentiality for a computing platform and its applications. Some examples are game
consoles or military embedded systems. Computer hackers often have many techniques at
their disposal to compromise secret information the designers try to hide in either soft-
ware or hardware. If necessary, they can construct specialized hardware or even specially
designed printed circuit boards or cracking/spoofing devices to recover protected secret in-
formation. Some typical techniques include front side bus trace analysis, memory trace
analysis, hardware spoofing devices, and signal replay devices, etc.
• Signal eavesdrop An adversary can collect sensitive information through logging
and analyzing software execution traces. Traditional protection model such as virtual
memory or process memory space isolation would not defend against such exploit be-
cause the attack occurs directly on the physical buses. Front side buses, peripheral
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buses, chip inter-connects, and external pins of integrated circuit chips are all poten-
tial targets of eavesdrop. Any information exposed by the external pins or transmitted
over the buses are vulnerable. As to the feasibility of tracing physical bus traffic, it
could be achieved by using an interposer board [30] and multi-channel high frequency
logic analyzer. As shown by [28], a skillful computer hacker may build custom trac-
ing or eavesdrop devices using cheap commodity components. Signal eavesdrop also
assists the adversary to launch more sophisticated surgical kind of attacks where the
adversary tries to alter or remove either a software or hardware security component
with certain hypothesis about the underlying security system or secret and observe
the consequences to prove the hypothesis.
• Device spoof. Apart from signal probe and eavesdrop, an adversary can directly
alter a printed circuit board, replace an onboard device with some spoof device in
order to bypass or subvert security measures. The famous MOD-chip attack on the
game consoles belongs to such category. MOD-chip unravels security protection im-
plemented in BIOS boot software through spoofed BIOS device and signal hijacking.
• Signal Replay. Furthermore, an adversary can launch physical signal replay attacks
to defeat security protections. This attack is often used in combination with the
signal eavesdrop and device spoof attacks where an eavesdrop device first intercepts
important signals and later replay the logged signals through a spoof device. For
example, lots of consumer hackers use this kind of attack to play copied games. First,
the consumer hacker will install some eavesdrop and spoof device. Then the hacker
will run a legitimate version of some game and eavesdrop some important security
code and stores the information in the spoof device. Next the hacker will make a
copy of the original software and load it. Assume that there are some copy protection
associated with the software to prevent the security code from being copied. During
loading, the spoof device will replay the security code to give a false image that the
system is reading the original released software.
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Throughout this thesis, it is assumed that external physical buses, chip-interconnects,
and external pins are unprotected and subject to potential malicious tamper. The physical
RAM itself is unprotected. An adversary could eavesdrop or overwrite the memory content
directly without involving the processors. Note that the thesis does not try to solve all the
physical attacks, especially those attacks outside system or platform protection level such as
compromising a security key through timing-analysis [33], power analysis [46] that uses the
power profile to infer security key bits, electromagnetic analysis that recovers sensitive data
through electromagnetic radiation analysis [66], micro-probing or screening that requires
de-packaging and extremely expensive devices. Most of those attacks can be mitigated using
secure practice of circuit design and packaging [32], which is orthogonal to the study of
this thesis. The platform and system level security measures can be combined directly with
those circuit and packaging level security practices to deliver system with strong security
strengths.
An effective way to fight against the aforementioned eavesdrop and spoof attacks at
platform level is memory encryption. Hardware cryptography based tamper resistant sys-
tems have been proposed to address data confidentiality protection under this threat model
[60, 37, 61, 73, 74]. Though memory encryption is a promising direction to counter many
physical attacks at platform level, it is still unclear how memory encryption can be de-
signed efficiently. The tradeoff between security and performance is not well understood.
As shown in our study [59], ill-conceived designs of memory encryption can have security
holes exposed to the hackers and end up with very weak or in the worst case no security
protection.
2.3 Related Work
2.3.1 Smart Cart and Security SOC
Smart card chip is a security chip based on system-on-chip design that integrates a number
of security funcitonalities, limited storage, and micro-processor into one chip. Smart card
chip is a stand-alone tamper-proof device. It has been used successfully in a number of
applications including GSM mobile telephones, DirectTV, EchoStar satellite receivers, and
8
Figure 1: Smart Cart Security Chip
the American Expres Blue card. Figure 1 shows a block diagram of a typical smart card
chip. Smart card chip achieves tamper-proof protection by integrating all the units of a
platform into a single chip - system on chip. It is very difficult for physical attacks that
rely on probing of chip inter-connect and external interface to break smart card security.
Other types of exotic side-channel attacks such as power analysis, electromagnetic analysis
are also preventable with a careful chip design practice when kept these attacks in mind.
Smart card attains tamper-proof by providing a SoC single chip solution that integrates
simple micro-processing element, memory, crypto engines into the same chip. This way of
building secure and trusted system does not apply to the scenario where a complex platform
has to be constructed using discrete components. For a complete high end platform, to
apply the same smart card concept, it would be to put everything including Gig bytes of
RAM, processor, north bridge, etc into one single chip, which is impossible under today’s
technology.
2.3.2 TCPA - Trusted Computing Platform Alliance
Software protection and trusted computing are among the most important issues in the
area of computer security. Traditionally, the protections on software are provided through
a trusted OS. The OS implements certain mechanisms to ensure that the applications are
protected and the information spaces from different applications are isolated. Consequently,
the software protection can be achieved since malicious applications will not be able to
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access others’ data without the permission of the OS. The trusted computing is ensured as
well since an application is protected from tampering by others using the underlying OS.
To improve the security model, some tamper resistant device is embedded into computer
architecture to ensure the loaded operating system is trusted. From there, a chain of trusted
applications are executed, each depending on the underlying layer. A typical example of
such computer architecture is the TCPA [4] and the related OS known as NGSCB [8].
TCPA relies on a tamper-proof device called TPM (trusted platform module) for providing
three main security functionalities.
• Protected storage and protected capabilities. TPM is a stand-alone smart card alike
chip. It provides secure internal persistent storage that can be used to seal sensitive
data such as symmetric keys for encrypted file, hashes of configuration information
and etc. TCPA stores sensitive data into shielded location and those data can be
accessed with protected capabilities.
• TCPA provides the necessary means for remote attestation. The TPM chip can report
the data it stores by signing the data with a unique key that is generated and certified
by the TPM chip. Each TPM chip has a unique public private key pair. An external
remote party can verify the data signed by a TPM chip using public private key
scheme.
• Integrity auditing. TPM can gather important configuration information of a plat-
form, store the data, compute an integrity hash and report the result to an external
third party upon request.
TCPA provides authentication and data signing services. It facilitates the so called
trusted boot functionality by using the TPM chip to verify the integrity of the BIOS and
bootstrap code. It can be used for digital content protection and digital right management
given the assumption that the end users would not launch a physical tamper on the plat-
form, which might be true for enterprise applications and environment. Though the TPM
chip itself is tamper-proof, the TCPA platform as a whole is not. TCPA is not designed
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Figure 2: TPM and TCPA Platform
to protect digital content confidentiality against physical tamper. When physical tamper
based information theft is a concern, TCPA would not provide sufficient protection because
the entire platform outside the TPM is vulnerable. As mentioned above, TCPA and the
TPM chip are designed to provide a tamper-proof signing services, which is infrequent in a
software’s execution life span. They are not meant to protect the entire software’s memory
space and all the intermediate software execution results. TPM as a specialized remote pe-
ripheral device sitting on the south bridge has neither the access nor the computing power
to provide comprehensive protection to the software running in the CPU with the code and
data stored in the system memory.
For complete protection, the TPM engine has to be integrated into the CPU and acts
as a security agent between the henceforth secured CPU and the un-trusted memory. The
result would be a tamper resistant processor, we will discuss in detail in the next subsection.
2.3.3 Tamper-Proof Platform And Micro-architecture
Integrating crypto services directly into the micro-processor to build tamper-resistant sys-
tem is an effective way to fight against physical tamper on software and data confidentiality
[60, 37, 61, 73, 74]. Such tamper-proof system uses memory encryption to provide a secure
environment where software can be executed in such a way that it is almost impossible to
be duplicated (copy-protection), altered (integrity), or reverse engineered (software confi-
dentiality). Data and software confidentiality is often protected through encryption of both
the executable image and the associated data. Integrity of software is often ensured through
layered integrity verification such as an authentication tree [60, 61].
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A typical secure processor architecture model comprises of a tamper-resistant proces-
sor, external memory and peripherals. Naturally, the protection boundary is drawn between
the processor and the external hardware units. Hardware units, like registers and on-chip
caches, are protected from any possible attack while the remaining hardware units such
as the external memory and peripherals are considered vulnerable to the physical attacks.
Besides the aforementioned hardware, the secure computing model also includes a small
trusted program, e.g., XVMM in XOM [37] and secure kernel in AEGIS [61]. The trusted
program will be called secure kernel hereafter. The secure kernel has a higher privilege
level than any other program including the regular operating systems and is responsible
for performing encryptions/decryptions for the protected applications when their data are
crossing the protection boundary. The secure kernel is also responsible for maintaining
sensitive data that resides in private memory and registers during context switches. Note
that confidentiality and integrity of “process context” are protected by the secure processor.
Here process context refers to all per-process information that need confidentiality or in-
tegrity protection including but not limited to register values, page table, dirty cache lines,
hash tree nodes, etc.
Most of the proposed systems support separate protection on software confidentiality
and integrity. In XOM [37], a per-process encryption key (triple-DES) is used to decrypt
software on-the-fly, while AEGIS [61] uses AES [20]. One major difference between AEGIS
and XOM is that AEGIS employs an on-chip hash tree to verify the integrity of entire process
space also in the execution time, thus preventing memory replay attack. As studies in [73]
indicate, block cipher based systems can incur substantial performance penalty. Systems
using encryption schemes similar to one-time pad (OTP) with relaxed integrity check [60,
73] are proposed because they support faster software execution. Alternative solutions also
aimed for better performance such as encrypting only small amount of carefully selected
instructions, called software slices, can also be found in the literature [74].
The objective of this thesis is to expand the research of the previous studies on tamper-
resistant processor design on several fronts. The thesis tries to solve some of the security
issues that have been largely ignored in the prior art. Furthermore, it offers new architecture
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optimization techniques to further reduce the overhead of the previous approaches and
improve the efficiency of tamper resistant processor. Finally, it also expands the coverage
of protection from the single processor to multi-processor.
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CHAPTER III
BASIC ENCRYPTION MODES AND MAC
For protecting randomly accessed memory, several standard encryption modes are viable and
some of them have been studied for secure processor design. One is the simple traditional
electronic code book mode, also called the ECB mode, another one is the CBC mode cipher-
block chaining, a third one is counter mode [17]. Applying these modes involves splitting
memory space into equal size blocks (often the same size as L2 cache line) and encrypting
each memory block separately to support random access of encrypted memory. The CBC
mode based secure processor design can be found in some earlier systems such as [61]
and counter-mode based systems are discussed in some recent publications [73, 60]. Note
that all the applications of encryption modes to secure processor design are confined to the
granularity of a memory block instead of the entire memory space.
From the security point of view, both the CBC mode and the counter mode are secure
to provide software confidentiality. However, many encryption modes such as the CBC
mode, counter-mode and stream cipher based modes allow an adversary to alter protected
data/code to any value at their choice under known plaintext attack by flipping individual
bits of the encrypted information, called malleability. One specific attack that exploits
this weakness is presented in [58]. A stream cipher is a cipher in which the input data
are encrypted one bit (sometimes one byte) at a time. Most stream ciphers consist of
a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) and a XOR gate. The PRNG is initialized
with a key, and outputs a sequence of bits known as a keystream. Encryption consists of
XORing the plaintext bits with the corresponding bits of the keystream; decryption consists
of XORing the ciphertext bits with the corresponding keystream bits. The conclusion is
that memory encryption based on malleable encryption modes should be used with extra
rigorous integrity protection to avoid disclose of the protected information.
14
One major overhead of hardware cryptography based protection on software confiden-
tiality is increased memory latency because memory blocks fetched from memory have to
be decrypted first before they can be used. For direct memory encryption, the encrypted
memory block (also called ciphertext), has to be fetched before a long decryption process
can start. The increased overall memory latency can cause substantial loss of performance.
The critical path of memory decryption consists of standard block cipher, such as AES
(advanced encryption standard) [20] or Triple-DES (data encryption standard) [49]. Real
hardware implementations of block ciphers show that it is often relatively easy to improve
the throughput of block ciphers through pipelining [19, 26] but the latency of block ciphers
is more difficult to reduce.
In this thesis, we propose architectural techniques and optimizations to reduce memory
decryption overhead. One is called one-time-pad prediction or sequence number(time-stamp,
counter) prediction or encryption pad prediction that combines prediction technique and
hardware cryptography to address the latency issue of counter-mode encrypted memory.
The basic idea is that a secure-processor predictable counter(or sequence number, time-
stamp) is used to generate a secure processor predictable encryption pad (or OTP) deter-
ministically for memory decryption before the sequence number (time-stamp, or counter)
is loaded from memory. Applying the same idea to other encryption modes to reduce
the memory decryption latency overhead is a great challenge because unlike the counter-
mode that inherently supports pre-computing of decryption pads, direct memory encryption
modes such as the ECB mode or the CBC mode use strait-forward sequential invokes of
block ciphers. In this thesis, we also propose a unique ciphertext prediction technique that
significantly hide decryption latency of directly encrypted software/data. The technique is
based on “value” prediction and speculative encryption of predicted data values to hide
decryption latency. Those optimization techniques will be described in details in the next
two chapters. Before that, we will discuss in this chapter different encryption modes and








































Figure 3: Standard ECB mode (electronic code block)
3.1 Encryption Mode
There are several standard encryption modes that are candidates for memory encryption,
for example, the ECB mode, the CBC mode, the OCB mode, and the counter mode mode.
Different encryption modes not only have different security strength against specific attacks
but also have dramatic differences in terms of speed, efficiency, area cost and performance
under hardware implementation.
There are two desirable security features of memory encryption,
First, it should not be feasible for an adversary to guess plaintext of some memory
block from its ciphtertext given that the adversary knows plaintext and ciphtertext of some
other memory block. In anther word, identical plaintexts stored in different memory blocks
do not produce identical ciphertexts.
Second, it should not be feasible for an adversary to guess plaintext of some memory
block given that the adversary can choose plaintext of some other memory block. Almost
all program applications today require some user inputs/data or command line inputs/data
or other sources of data that an adversary can manipulate. This security feature basically
requires that given the possibility that an adversary can control some data sources freely,
the adversary should not be able to guess secret information in other memory locations
through manipulating these data sources and compare the result ciphertexts.
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Figure 4: Patterns in ECB Encryption, Courtesy of Wikipedia.com
3.1.1 The Electronic Code Block (ECB) Mode
The ECB (electronic code block) mode is a standard encryption/decryption mode of using
block ciphers. Assume that each cache line size memory block is split into four chunks (64-
byte block into 4 16-byte chunks or 32-byte block into 4 8-byte chunks). Figure 3 shows
how each four chunks of plaintext are encrypted under the ECB mode using block cipher
and how decryption is carried out. Candidates of block cipher are Tripe-DES [49], AES
[20] and other encryption standards. One disadvantage of the ECB mode is that identical
memory blocks are encrypted to identical ciphertext blocks. This violates the first security
requirement set in the previous subsection. This means that the ECB mode by default
provides only weak protection on data patterns. One example to demonstrate the degree
to which the ECB can reveal patterns of data is shown in figure 4. The right image is
created from the left image using the ECB mode encryption. One way to fix this problem
is to concatenate every memory block with an RV (random bit vector) including its virtual
address and encrypt the result bit string. One major disadvantage of this approach is the
memory overhead. Assume that the RV is 64-bit (32-bit virtual address plus another 32-bit
random vector [61]), For 128-bit cipher, the overhead would be at least another 50%. In
a less secure setting, assume that the RV is 32-bit including only the virtual address, for
64-bit cipher, the additional overhead would be at least 50% and for 128-bit cipher, the
overhead would be at least another 25%.
3.1.2 The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode
Assume that each cache line size memory block is broke into four chunks (64-byte block
into 4 16-byte chunks or 32-byte block into 4 8-byte chunks). Figure 5 shows how each
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Figure 6: Example showing that second property is not satisfied by CBC Mode
18
decryption is carried out. In the CBC mode, each chunk of a block of plaintext is XORed
with the previous ciphertext chunk before being encrypted as shown in figure 5. the CBC
mode supports encryption of any number of memory chunks. But to facilitate random
memory access, the CBC mode is preferred to be carried out on each cache line size memory
block (4 or 8 chunks). Candidates of block cipher are Tripe-DES [49], AES [20] or other
encryption standards. The CBC mode based memory protection can be found in [61] with
AES as block cipher. To prevent disclosure of memory patterns, the same data value when
stored to different memory addresses must produce different ciphertext. This is achieved in
[61] by using an IV (initial vector) specific to each memory block. An IV consists of memory
block address, a random bit vector (RV) and bit padding. However, it is worth pointing
out that the CBC mode in [61] does not satisfy the second desired security requirement.
Because the address is XORed with plaintext of a memory block, an adversary is able
to guess information stored in a memory block in certain situations if the adversary can
manipulate plaintext data in some other memory blocks. One example is given in figure 6.
Assume that there is a piece of secret information stored in the first chunk of data in memory
block x. Further assume that the piece of data belongs to a finite set, for example, date
when a military action will be launched. Given the condition that the adversary is able
to manipulate plaintext in some other memory block, say block y, the adversary can use
the plaintexts shown at the bottom as guesses and let the secure processor to encrypt the
guesses. If the adversary can find one of the encrypted guesses in memory block y having
the same value as the ciphertext in memory block x, then the adversary can conclude that
the date used to generate the guess is the same as the date in memory block x (note that
RV is incremented after each memory update as suggested in [61]).
The security of the CBC mode against the adversary who has access to chosen plain-
texts is provided in [9]1. It is proved that if the underlying block cipher is secure, the CBC
mode offers secure encryption in the sense that the ciphertext is random. However, the
1A chosen plaintext attack is any form of cryptanalysis which assumes that an adversary has the capability
to choose arbitrary plaintexts to be encrypted and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts.
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CBC mode is vulnerable to an attack called, matching ciphertext attack [41]. It is recom-
mended that the CBC mode should not be used alone on block ciphers whose block length
is 64-bit. This motivated the research to combine or interleave standard modes, where
the modes themselves are considered as primitives [11]. However, mode interleaving and
combination substantially increases the latency of encryption/decryption. The CBC mode
is less vulnerable to the matching ciphertext attack for block cipher whose block length is
128 bit. But, the CBC mode has another weakness. It is vulnerable to chose ciphertext
attack 2. In another word, the CBC mode is chosen-ciphertext malleable. A malleable mode
means that it allows one to flip bits in the ciphertext and the flipped bits can induce flipped
corresponding bits in the plaintext. Non-melleable is always a desired security property.
From performance perspective, the CBC mode has a major disadvantage. It requires
sequential invoke of block cipher through a dependency chain. This greatly increases the la-
tency overhead and severely limits its efficiency for hardware facilitated memory protection.
Note that though some security weakness of the CBC mode may be fixed with additional
protection on integrity, it still has the performance disadvantage.
3.1.3 The Offset Code Block (OCB) Mode
The OCB (offset codeblock) mode was introduced in [54]. Its strong achieved security level
is proved in [53]. Here we only give brief description on how the OCB mode works and its
security properties and advantage in performance. Interested readers can refer to [53] for
details.
From the security perspective, the OCB mode provides higher security protection than
the most standard modes including the ECB mode and the CBC mode. The OCB mode is
non-malleable under chosen-ciphertext attack, which cannot be achieved by the CBC mode.
The OCB mode also belongs to the set of authenticated encryption modes that support
decryption and authentication at the same time. Figure 7 illustrates how the OCB mode
encrypts and decrypts a memory block (4 chunks) and how integrity code is computed. The
nonce is a bit string similar to the IV (initial vector) in the CBC mode. For memory block
2A chosen ciphertext attack is an attack on a cryptosystem in which the cryptanalyst chooses ciphertext
and causes it to be decrypted
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encryption, the nonce can consist of virtual address of cache line, concatenated with some
64-bit RV (random vector) and padding.
The OCB mode based memory encryption defined in this way satisfies both the security
requirements listed at the beginning of this chapter. Since virtual address concatenated with
the RV is used as nonce, the weakness of having detectable ciphertext patterns is avoided.
This prevents an adversary from guessing the encrypted data value based on the encrypted
values from other memory blocks, therefore satisfying the first security requirement. For
example, a large number of memory blocks may use zero as its data value. Under the OCB
mode based design using virtual address as nonce, zero will have different ciphertext for
different memory address. Because R is address dependent (obtained from the encrypted IV
that incudes cache line virtual address) and un-predictable (produced by a block cipher), the
attack described in figure 6 that violates the second desired security requirement does not
hold for the proposed OCB based design neither. Similar to [61], the nonce/RV associated
with dynamic data blocks is incremented each time the corresponding dirty data block is
evicted from the on-chip cache 3. Also note that the L in figure 7 is a secret pseudo-random
bit string computed by encrypting a constant [54, 53].
From the performance side, the OCB mode achieves high level parallelism for decrypt-
ing/encrypting data chunks. Because decryption/encryption of each data chunk is fully
independent of other data chunks, the OCB mode is fully paralleziable and suitable for
high performance hardware implementation. Fully parallelizable means that each chunk of
data can be encrypted or decrypted at the same time.
Detailed explanation of each step of the OCB mode operation such as 2L and the +
operation requires some background knowledge in number theory and cryptography and
interested readers can refer to the original OCB paper for details. The OCB mode is a
better choice for direct memory block encryption not only because it is more secure but
also because it can deliver better performance. It is worth pointing out that the nonce or
IV in both the the CBC and the OCB mode “needs not to be random, unpredictable, or


































































Figure 7: OCB Based Protection
secret” [54].
3.1.4 Counter Mode
Counter mode encryption is a common symmetric-key encryption scheme [17]. It uses a
block cipher (e.g. AES [20]), a keyed invertible transform that can be applied to short
fixed-length bit strings. To encrypt with the counter mode, one starts with a plaintext
P, a counter cnt, a block cipher E, and a key. An encryption bitstream (OTP) of the
form E(key, cnt) || E(key, cnt+1) || E(key, cnt+2) ...|| E(key, cnt+n-1) is generated as
shown in figure 8. This bitstream is XORed with the plaintext bit string P, producing
the encrypted string ciphertext C. To decrypt, the receiver computes the same pad used
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Figure 8: Counter Mode Encryption
by the sender based on the same counter and key, XORs the pad with C, then restores
the plaintext P. P is padded, if necessary, to facilitate the OTP length. Counter mode is
known to be secure against chosen-plaintext attacks, meaning the ciphertexts hide all partial
information about the plaintexts, even if some a priori information about the plaintext is
known. This has been formally proved in [9]. Security holds under the assumptions that
the underlying block cipher is a pseudo-random function family (this is conjectured to be
true for AES) and that a new unique counter value is used at every step. Thus a sequence
number, a time stamp or a random number can be used as an initial counter. Note that
the counter does not have to be encrypted. As most encryption modes, counter mode is
malleable and thus is not secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. For example, flipping
one bit in a ciphertext results in the flipped bit in the plaintext. Also, counter mode does
not provide authentication (integrity) of the data. For these reasons an additional measure
such as message authentication code (MAC) should be used. If a secure MAC is applied
to the counter mode ciphertext during the encryption and is verified during the decryption
process, then the resulting scheme provides authentication and integrity, is non-malleable
and is secure against the chosen-ciphertext attacks. This is formally proved in [10]. As










     counter
Encrypted RAM Block
(32 bytes)
     counter
Encrypted RAM Block
(32 bytes)
     counter
Encrypted RAM Block
(32 bytes)




  RANDOM ACCESS MEMORY
Unprotected DomainProtected Domain
Figure 9: Concept of Counter Mode Security
are caused by lack of knowledge.
Memory encryption schemes based on the counter mode were employed for its high effi-
ciency by some prior proposed security architectures [60, 73]. In these schemes, a counter4 is
associated with each cache line size memory block of the physical RAM as shown in figure 9.
Whenever a cache line is evicted from the secure processor, the corresponding counter is
incremented and the result is forwarded to the crypto-engine to generate the OTP for the
evicted cache line. Meanwhile, the corresponding counter value in the memory is updated.
When an encrypted memory block is fetched, the corresponding counter must be fetched
first from the memory to regenerate the OTP for decryption. As we mentioned earlier the
counters do not need to be encrypted because the security strength of counter mode does
not rely on their secrecy [9]. Unlike other direct memory encryption schemes that serial-
ize cache line fetching and decryption process, the potential advantage offered by counter
mode is that it overlaps the OTP generation with fetching of the encrypted program and
data [60, 73]. However, to compute the OTP for a fetched cache line, the counter needs to be
fetched from the memory first, eliminating much of the advantage of OTP pre-computation.
3.2 Comparison of Different Memory Decryption Speedup
Techniques
In addition to choosing encryption modes that achieve the best balance in terms of perfor-
mance, area, and security, computer architecture researchers also tried to experiment with
4In many encryption mode descriptions the counter is sometimes referred to as sequence number, nonce,
initial vector. We will use sequence number or counter interchangeably throughout this thesis.
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different architectural level design optimizations to help reduce the extra memory latency
caused by memory decryption. We will briefly discuss two of these techniques, sequence
number caching and memory pre-decryption.
3.2.1 Sequence number caching
Caching sequence numbers or time stamps required for decryption was proposed in [60, 73].
As shown in [60, 73], sequence number caching can effectively reduce decryption latency
overhead of counter mode based memory encryption schemes. However, sequence number
caching requires significant chip area overhead as the size of sequence number cache grows to
hundred of KB for achieving high sequence number cache hit rate. Ideally, for every virtual
memory page present in the TLB, if all of the page’s sequence numbers are cached, the
system would have 100% sequence number cache hit rate and have the smallest decryption
latency overhead. But such kind of system will have very high cost in area.
3.2.2 Memory Prefetch and Pre-decryption
Prefetch was intensively studied for hiding memory latency [7, 14, 67, 68]. When memory
is encrypted, a prefetched memory block can be pre-decrypted. There are many challenges
of using prefetch to reduce latency overhead of direct encrypted memory. First, memory
prefetch/ pre-decryption still conducts memory read and decryption operations sequentially.
The combined latency of memory access and decryption can be twice as much as a simple
memory read. To hide such long latency, prefetch requests need to be issued long enough
prior to the usage of the prefetched/pre-decrypted data. This can be a challenge for many
prefetch techniques and the accuracy of prefetch may decrease if it has be issued much
earlier. Second, prefetch/pre-decryption can cause cache pollution if the pre-decrypted
data are stored in the regular caches. Third, prefetch/pre-decryption can increase workload




Integrity verification is a critical component of secure processor design. Integrity verifi-
cation, achieved by employing message authentication codes (MAC) [43], guarantees the
detection of any unauthorized data modification. The MACs are stored along with each
encrypted memory block such as a cache line. Similar to the case of encryption, there are
many approaches and standards for generating a MAC, for example, HMAC [34], CBC-
MAC [12], to name a few. For each dirty writeback, the plaintext of the dirty cache line
must be re-encrypted and stored with its updated MAC value. It is possible to conduct
decryption and integrity verification concurrently. Some encryption modes called authenti-
cated encryption go even further to combine decryption and integrity verification into one
process. Such examples include LAPM [31] and XCBC [24]. Authenticated decryption has
less implementation and design complexity but makes decryption latency roughly the same
as authentication latency. In general, in secure processor, authentication takes longer time
than decryption because in theory authentication can only be initiated after data is fetched
from memory. In secure processor design, the existence of various side-channel exploits on
software confidentiality requires close-coupling between integrity verification and memory
decryption. To issue decrypted instructions or data to a superscalar processor pipeline
without integrity verification may put software and data confidentiality at risk.
3.4 Implementation
Implementation of hardware crypto engines is relatively straightforward. Most commer-
cial crypto engines support standard ciphers such as Triple-DES (TDES), Rijndael-AES
and standard MAC schemes. The trade-offs between performance, area, and energy con-
sumption have been studied. In general, when comparing against a full-fledged processor
implementation, the overhead of a crypto engine in terms of area and power consumption
has been shown to be rather insignificant.
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3.4.1 Cipher
A pipelined implementation of TDES can achieve about 20Gbits/sec using roughly 55K
gates. Considering that the critical path of a single stage of TDES implemented as a
customized design using dynamic logic [55], and a 0.18 µ process, is about 2nsec, the total
latency will be about 96nsec. The throughput can be further increased significantly when
multiple pipelines are deployed to exploit the concurrency.
The Rijndael cipher can process data blocks of 128, 192, or 256 bits by using key lengths
of 128, 196 and 256 bits. It is based on a round function, which is iterated 10 times for a
128-bit length key, 12 times for a 192-bit key, and 14 times for a 256-bit key. Each round
consists of four stages. For high throughput and high speed hardware implementation,
Rijndael is often unrolled and with each round pipelined into multiple pipeline stages (4-7)
to achieve high decryption/encryption throughput [42, 27, 26]. As shown in [27], the total
area of unrolled and pipelined Rijndael is about 100K - 150K gates to achieve a throughout
of 15-20Gbit/sec. Based on our own synthesized Verilog implementation, each decryption
round of pipelined AES-Rijndael takes less than 5nsec using 0.18µ standard cell library and
each encryption round takes even less time. The area overhead of encryption process is also
small as it requires less number of gates. In this study, unless specified, the default latency
is 80ns for the 256-bit AES.
Since the implementation of a crypto engine occupies a very small area, the extra power
consumption is also very low. According to both industry standard and our implementation,
it is estimated that a crypto engine consumes about tens of mW when active. In fact, many
mobile devices such as PDAs and mobile phones already support hardware crypto-engines
for encrypted wireless communication with very low energy overhead.
3.4.1.1 Encryption Mode
Encryption mode has major impact on secure processor performance. A few recent pub-
lished works have provided detailed evaluation and comparison of the ECB mode, the CBC
mode, and the counter mode [62, 73, 57]. In all the studies, counter mode delivers the best
performance because it allows pre-computation of decryption pads in parallel with memory
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fetch by encrypting a sequence number or time stamp. Once the encrypted data arrives,
decryption will be performed by XORing the decryption pad and the encrypted data just
fetched. With the assistance of sequence number caching [73] or prediction [57], decrypt-
ing counter mode encrypted data incurs only very small latency overhead. Furthermore,
counter mode allows critical word to be accessed and decrypted first before the rest of a data
block is fetched or decrypted. Our reference implementation of encryption mode is based
on [57]. The OCB based design can use any block cipher with proven security. Typical
choices are Triple-DES (TDES) and Rijndael-AES.
3.4.1.2 Integrity Verification
Integrity verification based on MAC is often standard operation. But variation of different
MAC approaches can have significant impact on verification latency. Though it is plau-
sible to carry out integrity verification and decryption concurrently, unlike counter mode,
integrity verification must wait until the data is fetched. Furthermore, integrity verification
has to be conducted on the entire data block. As a result, latency of integrity verification
is often longer than decryption. In the reference implementation, we use standard HMAC
[34] for protecting integrity of data blocks stored in the external RAM. The default size of
MAC is 64 bits. The reference HMAC uses standard SHA-256 algorithm [50]. Simulation
study is based on Verilog implementation of SHA-256 [64], synthesized using Synopsys.
This design is totally asynchronous and has a gate count of 19,000 gates. The latency
for this design is 74ns for 512 bits of padded input (padding with the required padding in
SHA-256).
In addition to per-data block based integrity verification, secure processor sometimes
also applies a hash tree or MAC tree for preserving the overall memory space integrity and
preventing replay attacks of data blocks. This causes substantially additional amount of
latency overhead. The CHTree scheme in [62] constructs an m-ary hash tree where m is
the number of child nodes per parent node has and is equal to the size of the cache line
divided by the size of hash values. A typical value of m is 4. To verify a data block, it
takes logm(L) hashing computations, assuming the entire memory space comprising L total
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L1 I-Cache DM, 8KB, 32B line
L1 D-Cache DM, 8KB, 32B line
L2 Cache 4way, Unified, 64B line, write back cache
256KB and 1M
L1/L2 Latency 1 cycle / 4 cycles (256KB), 8 cycles (1M)
Memory Bus 200MHz, 8B wide
Memory Latency X-5-5-5 (core clocks)
X depends on page status
CAS latency 20 mem bus clocks
Precharge latency (RP) 7 mem bus clocks
RAS-to-CAS (RCD) latency 7 mem bus clocks
Triple-DES latency 96ns, 48 stages
AES latency 80ns
data blocks. The reference implementation uses a m-ary MAC tree instead of hash tree for
improved performance and security. A default value of m is either 4 or 8. This means that
a new MAC is calculated over every 4 or 8 MACs. Recursively, each node of the MAC tree
is a MAC of 4 or 8 child MACs. On top of the MAC tree is a root MAC of 64 bits. The
root MAC is a signature of the entire memory space of a software application.
3.5 Simulation Framework
Our simulation framework is based on SimpleScalar [13] running SPEC2000 INT and FP
Alpha binaries compiled with -O3 option. We integrated a more accurate DRAM model
[25] to improve the system memory modelling, in which bank conflicts, page miss, row
miss are modelled based on the PC SDRAM specification. The architectural parameters
used for performance evaluation are listed in Table 11. Each benchmark is fast-forwarded
and simulated at representative places according to SimPoint [56] for 400M instructions
in performance mode. During fast-forwarding, L1 cache, L2 cache, and frequent value
tracking are simulated. We subset the simulations for those with high L2 misses and memory
throughput requirements.
The simulation environment and setup herein discussed is the default experiment setting
for all the studies across this thesis. If a performance evaluation is conducted under a







































Figure 10: Normalized IPC under CBC or OCB, 256K L2
3.6 Performance Comparison of Encryption Modes
Here we summarize performance results of comparing different encryption modes. The
results are collected on two L2 cache settings, 256K and 1M. Small L2 cache is critical
because protection on data confidentiality is not only deemed for very high end machines
but commodity platforms as well. Majority sold processors for regular users have L2 cache
of only 256K or even less. Note that very large L2 size is not appropriate for evaluating
SPEC2000 benchmarks because the entire working set of most SPEC2000 benchmarks can
be fit into a very large L2.
3.6.0.3 Performance of OCB vs. CBC
First, we compared performance of the cipher-blocking chaining, the CBC mode based
memory encryption vs. the offset codeblock, OCB based memory encryption. As addressed
before, the OCB mode is not only more secure but also friendly for parallel processing of
multiple memory chunks under large cache line size. We used AES as the underlying cipher.
Under AES, each line is divided into 4 chunks. Figure 10 shows the IPC speedup of the






































Figure 11: Normalized IPC under CBC and OCB , 1M L2
under 1M L2. As shown by both figures, for all the benchmarks, the OCB based approach
achieves higher IPC performance than the CBC mode. Under 256K L2, the average IPC
speedup is over 17%. Aside from using 256K L2, we also compared the OCB vs. the CBC
under 1M L2. Similar to the scenario of 256K L2, the OCB outperforms CBC, the IPC
speedup is about 11%. The main advantage of the OCB over the CBC is that it allows
critical memory block to be decrypted first whereas under the CBC mode, all the memory
blocks have to be decrypted sequentially.
3.6.0.4 Performance of Counter Mode vs. OCB
We also compared performance of the counter mode based memory encryption vs. the
offset codeblock, OCB based memory encryption. Both the counter mode and the OCB
mode support parallel memory block decryption and allow critical memory block to be
decrypted first. Furthermore, counter mode allows decryption process to be paralleled
with memory fetch. This means that under counter mode, part or sometimes all of the
decryption latency can be overlapped with memory fetch latency. This provides additional
performance advantage. However, to attain such benefit, sequence numbers or counters











































































Figure 13: Normalized IPC under CBC and OCB, 1M L2
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have to be fetched also from the memory, counter mode will no longer have the attractive
performance edge over the OCB mode. In this evaluation, we assume that the sequence
numbers are perfectly cached under counter mode.
Figure 12 shows the IPC speedup of counter mode over the OCB mode under 256K
L2 and figure 13 shows the IPC speedup under 1M L2. As shown by both figures, for all
the benchmarks, counter mode based approach achieves higher IPC performance than the
OCB mode given that the sequence numbers are cached. Under 256K L2, the average IPC
speedup is about 22%. Similar to the scenario of 256K L2, under 1M L2 setting, counter
mode also outperforms the OCB mode. The IPC speedup is about 13%.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we compared the pros and cons of several encryption modes for encrypting
system memory. The results show that both the OCB and the counter mode outperform
the CBC mode because of support for parallel decryption and support of decrypting the
critical memory block first. Between the counter mode and the OCB mode, the counter
mode provides additional performance advantage because it allows decryption latency to be
overlapped with memory fetch latency given that the sequence numbers or counter values
are cached. In the next two chapters, we will introduce some new optimization solutions
different from caching and pre-decrypting for reducing memory decryption latency overhead




In [60, 73], a small sequence number (or counter) cache is used to cache counter values
on-chip to exploit the advantage of counter mode architecture. Profile studies show that
sequence number cache hit rate does not grow steadily with its size. One possible expla-
nation of this “plateau” effect of the sequence number cache is that the sequence number
cache may contain (multiple) very large working sets . A small cache of several Kbytes may
be enough to capture the first working set, but other working sets might be too large to be
captured by a sequence number cache of tens or even hundreds of Kbytes. In other words,
the area cost to improve the hit rate via simple caching can be prohibitively high.
We propose an alternative solution via prediction and precomputation to hide memory
decryption latency more effectively with minimal area overhead. The premise is that in
the counter mode, predictable counters are often used to generate the encryption OTP
deterministically using some standard encryption function. Hence one can speculate the
counter value and pre-compute the OTP before the counter is loaded from memory. It is
important to point out that even though the counter value is deterministic and predictable,
the cryptographic function used to generate the OTP is not. These functions involve a
secret key only known to the secure processor itself. It is computationally infeasible for an
adversary to predict the OTP even with a known counter value.
4.1 OTP Prediction and Precomputation
In this section we explain the concept behind OTP prediction and pre-computation1. We
first explain the technique using our proposed regular sequence number prediction algorithm
and we point out a potential performance issue for the regular sequence number prediction.
Next, we discuss a simple modification to the regular prediction scheme to redress the
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Figure 14: Timeline Comparison of Different OTP Computation
potential performance problem. It is also important to note that OTP prediction can be
tied with any scheme based on the counter mode or stream cipher such as those discussed
in [60, 73].
4.1.1 Regular OTP prediction
The concept of OTP prediction and pre-computation can be understood from the time-
lines shown in figure 14. We assume that the memory access latency and the encryption
OTP generation latency are comparable2. We also assume a fully-pipelined encryption and
decryption AES crypto-engine. The input block of the AES is a concatenation of a 64-bit
virtual address and a 64-bit sequence number. For 32-bit architecture, the virtual address
is padded to 64-bit. The timeline of figure 14(a) shows a scenario when fetching a cache
2We later justify this assumption in Section 4.3.
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line in a baseline security architecture without any support to accelerate the decryption
process. It is obvious that the crypto-engine pipeline sits idle for the whole time between
the time when the request is sent to the memory and the time when the sequence number
is returned. Now suppose that in our architecture the sequence number of a given cache
line is predictable and only depends on the page the cache line is associated with. We will
justify our claim later. figure 14(b) shows the timeline of our framework. A certain number
of sequence number guesses, G1, G2, ..., Gx, can be tried and passed to the crypto-engine
for pre-computing their corresponding OTPs while the actual memory request is being sent
to memory. Since the AES cipher is pipelined, the predicted and precomputed OTPs will
be available around the time the actual sequence number is obtained from memory. The
precomputed OTPs are represented as E(Key,G1),E(Key,G2)... in the figure 14(b). When
the actual sequence number returns, we check it against all the guessed numbers. If one
of them matches, in our case G3, we already have the encryption pad E(key,G3) for G3.
We can now directly obtain the plaintext by XORing the pre-computed OTP with the
encrypted cache line fetched. The rationale of our scheme is to utilize the idle time of the
crypto-engine pipeline for pre-computing several OTPs and thus hide the memory access
latency if one of the speculations succeeds.
To demonstrate its difference from prior art, figure 14(c) shows the sequence number
caching technique. A sequence number cache stores a finite set of sequence numbers for
evicted lines. If a request hits the sequence number cache, the sequence number is obtained
and the OTP generation can begin before the cache line returns from memory. For a
sequence number cache miss, the decryption process will be serialized similar to the baseline
scenario. One issue of sequence number caching is the hit rate, which can be substantially
reduced when the working set is large or in-between context switches. Another issue is the
potential large hardware overhead dedicated to the sequence number storage for achieving
decent hit rates. It should be kept in mind that the area overhead of our scheme is minimal
compared to the caching scheme because we only need a small buffer to store the pre-
computed OTPs. We will show in our results that the benefit we receive with our optimized
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Figure 15: OTP Prediction
also complementary to the sequence number cache. We can combine them in a design to
gain benefits offered by both. Now we elaborate our prediction architecture in details.
Figure 15 shows the design of our OTP prediction and precomputation mechanism. A
root OTP sequence number is assigned to each virtual memory page by a hardware random
number generator each time the virtual page is mapped to a physical one. All the cache
lines of the same page use the same root OTP sequence number for their initial values. Each
TLB entry is tagged with the root sequence number of the corresponding page. Whenever
a dirty line is evicted from the secure processor, the sequence number associated with the
corresponding line is incremented. For each missing cache line, a request for the line itself
and its associated sequence number is sent to memory. Simultaneously, the prediction logic
takes the root OTP sequence number associated with the virtual page, and inserts a few
sequence number guesses into the request queue. The pipelined crypto-engine takes each
request and computes its corresponding encryption OTP. Upon the receipt of the correct
sequence number from memory, the processor compares it with the set of sequence number
predictions. If a match is found, then the corresponding pre-computed OTP is used to
decrypt the fetched memory data. If no match can be found, the crypto-pipeline will take
the newly received sequence number and computes its OTP, same as baseline. In summary,
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Figure 16: Prediction Tracking and Sequence Number Resetting
pre-computes encryption pads using speculated sequence numbers.
Sequence number prediction is based on the observation, that during the whole lifetime
a physical memory page is bound to a virtual memory page, many of its cache lines are only
updated a very small number of times. Our profiling study of SPEC benchmarks indicates
that many lines are rarely updated during the entire process lifetime, in other words, when
a cache line missing the L2 cache, its sequence number is very likely to be within a small
range of the first time initialized random sequence number associated with that memory
page. Regular OTP prediction is designed to predict sequence numbers associated with
static and infrequently updated data.
4.1.2 Adaptive OTP prediction for frequently updated data
There is a concern about the performance of OTP prediction over a large time window of
execution. It is reasonable to suspect that prediction rate may drop as data are frequently
updated. To address this issue, a dynamic prediction rate tracking and sequence number
reset mechanism is proposed. The purpose of this mechanism is to identify those virtual
pages with low prediction rate caused by frequent memory updates and reset its page root
sequence number to a new random value so that high predictability can be maintained.
Prediction tracking is performed in hardware using a scheme as follows. There is a 16
bit prediction history vector (PHV) for each memory page. The PHV records hit or miss of
the last 16 sequence number prediction on cache lines of the associated page. Every time
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a cache line is loaded from memory, the PHV of that page is updated by shifting the new
prediction result into the vector (1 for misprediction and 0 for hit). When the total number
of mispredictions of the last 16 predictions is greater than a threshold, the root sequence
number associated with that page will be reset to a new randomly generated number. After
reset, blocks of the involved page will use this new number for OTP generation next time
when it is evicted from the L2.
The adaptive predictor requires the ability to test whether a sequence number used by
a cache line is counted based on the current root sequence number. Note that this function
does not have to be 100% accurate because a wrong test result will only cause reset of
the sequence number. A simple implementation is to use the distance between a sequence
number and the current root sequence number as a criteria. To decide whether a sequence
number started its count from the current root sequence number, its distance to the current
root is calculated. If the distance is negative or too large, the sequence number is considered
counting from an old root sequence number. If a mismatch is detected, the corresponding
cache line will reset its sequence number to the current root sequence number.
4.2 Security Analysis
We discuss a few issues about OTP prediction security in this section.
• Security is guaranteed by the security analysis provided in [9] since we did not modify
the counter mode encryption scheme itself, but rather showed how to decrease the long
decryption process latency via architectural techniques.
• In OTP prediction, different memory blocks of the same page may use the same se-
quence number. This, however will not weaken security. When the OTP is generated,
the address is used together with the sequence number and a prefix-padding. Since each
memory block has a different address, the resultant OTP will be different for differ-
ent memory blocks. Knowing OTP of a particular memory block does not reveal any
information about the OTPs of other blocks of the same page.
• The root sequence number is set and reset using a hardware random number generator.
For the sequence number to wrap-around, it has to be incremented 264 times. This
39
equals hundreds of years under the current processor clock speed.
4.3 Simulation Methodology and Implementation
4.3.1 Simulation framework
Our simulation framework is based on SimpleScalar 3.0 running SPEC2000 INT and FP
benchmark programs compiled with -O3 option. We implemented architecture support for
OTP Prediction and root sequence number history over SimpleScalar’s out-of-order Alpha
simulator.
The architectural parameters used for performance evaluation are listed in table 4.3.1.
To model OTP prediction faithfully, we added memory profiling support to SimpleScalar
that keeps track of memory transactions for evaluating OTP prediction, such as number
of times a memory block is evicted from the L2 cache, the sequence number assigned to
each virtual page, and etc. Each benchmark is fast-forwarded at least 4 billion instructions
and simulated in a representative place according to SimPoint [56] for 400M instructions in
performance mode. During the fast-forwarding, the L1 cache, the L2 cache, the sequence
number cache, the sequence number prediction mechanism are simulated. The profiled
memory status is also updated during the fast-forwarding. To study the performance sen-
sitivity of the OTP prediction optimization, we also run each benchmark in a simplified
mode that simulates the memory hierarchy and the OTP prediction for 8 billion instruc-
tions. We used 16 bits for the prediction history window. By default, the sequence number
of each virtual page is reset if the number of prediction misses over the last 16 is greater
than or equal to 12. The prediction depth, that is the number of guesses generated for each
missing sequence number, is set to 5. We also use a prediction swing of 3 for context-based
prediction to be discussed in Section 4.5.4. Per-page root sequence numbers require small
storage space. Given a 64-bit sequence number and 256 page entries cached, the total cost
of storing root sequence numbers is about 2KB. Also, to simulate the effect of OS and
system, dirty lines of caches are flushed every 25million cycles. Furthermore, we subset the
SPEC simulations for those with high L2 misses. All the benchmarks are simulated under
the security setting that data confidentiality must be protected.
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L1 I-Cache DM, 8KB, 32B line
L1 D-Cache DM, 8KB, 32B line
L2 Cache 4way, Unified, 32B line,
Writeback, 256KB and 1MB
L1 Latency 1 cycle
L2 Latency 4 cycles (256KB), 8 cycles (1MB)
Memory Bus 200MHz, 8B wide
Memory Latency X-5-5-5 (core clocks)
X depends on page status
CAS latency 20 mem bus clocks
Precharge latency (RP) 7 mem bus clocks
RAS-to-CAS (RCD) latency 7 mem bus clocks
14 rounds with an initial and
AES latency a final round, 6 stages 1ns each
96ns
Sequence number cache 4KB, 128KB, 512KB (32B line)
Prediction History Vector 16 bit
PHV threshold 12
Prediction depth
(used by all predictions) 5
Prediction swing
(used by context-based only) 3
4.4 Evaluation of adaptive OTP prediction
In this section we summarize the prediction rates and IPC results of adaptive OTP predic-
tion. The results are collected for two L2 cache sizes, 256KB and 1MB. Choosing a 256KB
L2 cache is not only representative for many contemporary machines but also appropriate
for our evaluation given the SPEC benchmark suite is known to have relative small working
set.
4.4.1 OTP prediction rate over large execution time
One concern about OTP prediction is that its performance over execution time or its ca-
pability to predict dynamic data. To answer this question, we simulated performance of
OTP prediction over a relatively large time window, 8 billion instructions. We also used
two different sequence number cache sizes, 128KB, and 512KB, for our reference compar-
ison. Figure 17 shows the sequence number hit rates for different sequence number cache
sizes and our OTP prediction. As the results indicate, the hit rate of sequence number
cache is relatively low even with a decent sized 128KB sequence number cache. The results







































Figure 17: Sequence Number Hit Rates, 256KB L2, 8 billion instructions
execution window. The average prediction rate is 82%, higher than that of a 128KB or
a 512KB sequence number cache. Figure 18 shows the same comparison with a 1MB L2.
Similarly, OTP prediction also achieves a better performance than sequence number caching
for a fairly large L2. The average prediction rate is 80% compared to 57% for a 128KB
sequence number cache.
The results also verify the initial assumption that sequence numbers tend to have large
working set. One possible explanation is that for the sequence number cache to perform
well, the processor has to miss on the same memory block many times within a short time
window before the sequence number is evicted from the sequence number cache. Due to the
temporal locality and memory working set, a processor rarely repeats missing on the same
memory block many times in a short duration of time. This illustrates the limitation of
using caching for improving performance since the area cost to cache the complete working
set can be prohibitively high.
Figure 19 breaks the total number of hits into three categories, 1) hit both, a sequence
number that is in the sequence number cache and can be predicted; 2) prediction only, a







































Figure 18: Sequence Number Hit Rates, 1MB L2, 8 billion instructions
sequence cache only, sequence number cannot be predicted but available in the cache. The
results are collected from simulation using a 32KB sequence number cache plus prediction.
As seen from the figure, OTP prediction can uncover more performance opportunities lost
by the sequence number caching scheme.
4.4.2 IPC improvement using OTP prediction
Increasing prediction rate has a great performance impact on memory-bound benchmarks.
For example, without OTP prediction, the average IPC of the selected benchmarks only
reaches 82% of IPC of an oracle scenario where every sequence number is cached. In partic-
ular, bzip2, mcf, mgrid, twolf, and vpr have their ratios in the range of 60% to 80%. If OTP
prediction can achieve ideal 100% prediction rate, the potential performance improvement
would be in the range of 20% to 40%.
Figure 20 and figure 21 show normalized IPC performance of large sequence number
caches vs. adaptive OTP prediction. The IPC is normalized to the oracle case. As shown,
OTP prediction can effectively improve performance. On average, IPC is increased by 18%
and 11% for a 256KB L2 and a 1MB L2, respectively. For ten of the fourteen SPEC2000































Figure 19: Breakdown of Contribution of Sequence Number Cache, and OTP Prediction
their improvements over 20% and two over 30%. For every benchmark, OTP prediction
outperforms a 128KB sequence number cache. For average IPC, OTP prediction even
performs better than a very large 512KB sequence number cache. The results clearly show
the advantage of OTP prediction over a pure sequence number caching.
Consistent with the prediction rate results, sequence number prediction is more effective
than caching for overall performance. To achieve similar performance using caching, the
required sequence number cache size needs to be unreasonably large, larger than a typical
unified L2 cache.
4.5 Optimizing OTP Prediction
Although adaptive OTP prediction can handle both infrequently and some frequently up-
dated data, our study of prediction rate shows that there is still room for improvement. In
this section, we propose and investigate some unique optimizing techniques to increase the
prediction performance for frequently updated data.
4.5.1 Profiling misprediction
First, we conduct profiling studies on OTP misprediction. We found there are two main
contributors. One is prediction depth which is equivalent to the number of predictions can be
made for each missing line. Profiling studies reveal that some lines are evicted far more often








































Figure 20: Normalized IPC Under Different Sequence Number Cache Sizes(4KB, 128KB







































Figure 21: Normalized IPC Under Different Sequence Number Cache Sizes(4KB, 128KB
and 512KB) vs OTP Prediction, 1MB L2
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depth, i.e. more predictions per line, does not solve the problem as too many predictions
will overload the crypto-engine and could lead to negative impact on performance. The
second contributor is due to the reset of the root sequence number. After the per-page root
sequence number is reset, all the future predictions on cache lines of the same page will use
the new root sequence number instead of the old ones that causes predictions of lines using
old root sequence numbers to fail.
4.5.2 Two-level prediction
To reduce mispredictions caused by short prediction depth, we introduce a novel range
prediction technique to be used in combination with the regular OTP prediction. Regular
OTP prediction is good at predicting sequence numbers that are not updated frequently.
For example, if the prediction depth is 8 and a cache line has been evicted 23 times. It is
not possible for the regular OTP prediction to predict correctly. However, if we divide the
distance between each sequence number to its root sequence number into multiple ranges,
for instance, four ranges, [1, 8], [9, 16], [17, 24], [25, ∞] and have OTP predictions generated
only under a particular range for each sequence number, it will greatly increase the hit rate
of OTP prediction without adding pressure to the crypto-engine pipeline. We call this
design, Two-level OTP Prediction, with the first level predicting the possible range of a
sequence number and the second level using regular OTP prediction in that range. To
implement a two-level OTP prediction, range information associated with each cache line
needs to be encoded and stored. In fact, the cost of the first level prediction is small. For
example, assume that there are four ranges, this information can be encoded with only 2
bits. Under a 4KB page and 32-byte lines, the cost to store range information for all the
128 lines of a page is only 256 bits.
When accessing a sequence number, the secure processor will look up the range pre-
diction table, where each entry of the table stores the range information for all lines in a
page. Then the retrieved range information is used by the regular OTP prediction where a
number of predicted sequence numbers are inserted to the prediction queue. The starting
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predicted sequence number is root sequence number + range lower bound, and the last pre-
dicted sequence number is root sequence number + range lower bound + prediction depth.
When a line is evicted from the processor, its associated entry in the range prediction table
is updated.
The additional cost of range prediction is relatively small considering a 64 entry table
costs only about 2KB with the benefit of quadruple the effective prediction depth.
4.5.3 Root sequence number history
Per-page root sequence number reset is important to maintain a satisfactory OTP prediction
performance. However, resetting and discarding old root sequence numbers may cause
predictions on sequence numbers based on discarded root numbers to fail. To prevent
misprediction caused by resetting, we introduced a sequence number memoization technique
that keeps a certain number of old root sequence numbers (usually very small, 1 or 2 at most)
as history. When predicting a missing sequence number, predictions based on both the new
root sequence number and the old sequence number(s) are generated. It is important to
note that when a dirty cache line is being evicted, the writeback is always encrypted using
a new OTP based on the current root sequence number.
4.5.4 Context Based Prediction
Context-based prediction is another OTP prediction optimization that can significantly im-
prove the OTP prediction rate. The idea of context-based prediction is very simple. We
use a register called Latest Offset Register (LOR) that records the offset sequence number
of the most recent memory access ( = sequence number - root sequence number). For a
new memory fetch, aside from the regular predictions based on the per-page root sequence
number, the context-based OTP prediction mechanism also generates a few more predic-
tions based on the LOR value. In the context-based prediction, two sets of prediction are
made. The first is our regular prediction using the prediction depth (pred depth). Assume
that root(addr) returns the root sequence number associated with fetched data, so the pre-
diction of sequence numbers falls in the range of [root(addr), root(addr) + pred depth], in
other words, (pred depth + 1) predictions are generated. The second prediction set uses
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the LOR value with a prediction swing (pred swing). The prediction falls in the range of
[Max(root(addr) + LOR− pred swing, root(addr)), root(addr) + LOR + pred swing] with
a maximum of 2 ·pred swing +1 predictions to be made. In our simulation, the pred depth
and pred swing are set to 5 and 3 respectively.
The context-based prediction has far less overhead than Two-level prediction because
it requires only one extra register rather than a range table. Comparing with the regular
OTP prediction scheme, the additional cost is almost negligible. However, the context-
based prediction does increase the workload on the OTP engine because it generates more
predictions. As will be shown, the context-based prediction in fact has the best prediction
rate among all three prediction schemes.
4.6 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we present performance evaluation of the proposed optimizations for im-
proving OTP prediction rate. We do not report the results for the root sequence number
history method since it shows only marginal improvement over the regular OTP prediction
scheme.
4.6.0.1 Two-level and Context based predictions
We use a 4-bit range predictor for each memory block and there are 64 entries in the range
prediction table (about 4KB size). The prediction rates of two-level prediction are shown
in figure 22 and figure 23. We can see a significant improvement over the regular OTP
prediction. The average prediction rate of two-level prediction is almost 96% with a 256KB
L2 and 95% with 1MB. Comparing with results in figure 17 and figure 18, two-level OTP
prediction using only 4KB range prediction table actually outperforms both the 128KB
and 512KB sequence number cache settings. However, the best prediction performance is
achieved by the context-based prediction. For nearly all benchmark programs, the context-
based prediction attains almost perfect prediction rate.
The prediction rate using a large L2 is often smaller than the prediction rate using
smaller L2 size. Since a large L2 typically reduces memory traffic, the number of predictions







































Figure 22: Hit Rate of Two-level Pred vs. Context-based Pred vs. Regular Pred, 256KB













































































Figure 24: Number of Predictions under 256KB vs. 1MB L2
number of miss predictions, larger L2 has less number of overall misses than smaller L2.
Figure 24 shows the absolute number of predictions.
Figure 25 and figure 26 show normalized IPC results for the two-level and the context-
based predictions. Both the two-level and the context-based predictions achieve better
performance over their regular counterpart. Using 256KB L2, for some benchmarks such as
ammp, bzip2, twolf, and vpr, the improvement is about 7%. With 1MB L2, the improvement
is about 4% for a number of benchmarks including applu, bzip2, mgrid, swim, twolf and vpr.
For most benchmarks, the context-based prediction outperforms two-level prediction. Note
that the context-based prediction also generates more predictions than two-level prediction.
Considering the extra range table cost of the two-level prediction, the context-based pre-



















































































This chapter describes an OTP prediction and precomputation mechanism for hiding de-
cryption latency in counter mode security architectures. In addition, we propose and evalu-
ate several optimization techniques to further improve the performance of OTP prediction.
The proposed adaptive OTP prediction improves the performance of memory-bound appli-
cations significantly over the prior sequence number caching method with a much smaller
area overhead. Without any extra on-chip cache, our adaptive OTP prediction can achieve
an average of 82% OTP prediction rate for both the infrequently and frequently updated
memory. For several memory-bound SPEC benchmark programs, the IPC improvement
is in the range of 15% to 40%. In addition to the regular prediction technique, a two-
level OTP prediction is proposed to further improve the prediction rate from 82% to 96%.
Finally, we propose a context-based OTP prediction that performs even better than the two-
level prediction. It also outperforms the caching scheme with a very large 512KB sequence
number cache. The two-level and the context-based predictions can provide additional 7%
IPC improvement on top of the regular OTP prediction. To summarize, with a minimal
area overhead, our techniques succeed in achieving significant performance improvement for




Cipher text prediction is another technique to hide latency overhead of encrypted memory.
It is based on frequent value prediction [39, 72] and specifically designed for memory encryp-
tion that uses parallelizable direct memory encryption modes such as the well known OCB
mode [54]. Unlike the counter mode, modes of direct memory block encryption themselves
do not support any pre-computing.
In this chapter, we explain value prediction and how this technique may be applied
to predict cyphertext. We will also describe how cyphertext prediction is applied to two
popular block ciphers, namely the Triple DES and the AES.
5.1 Value Prediction
Previous studies have shown the existence of predictable or frequent values among data
fetched from the external memory [39, 72]. For SPEC2000 benchmark suite, up to 80-90%
fetched dynamic data are from a small set of application dependent data values (8 to 64
most frequent values). Memory profiling results in [72] also show that on average, about
40% of the data stored in the entire memory space of an application are frequent values. The
existence of predictable and frequent values enables novel yet viable prediction techniques
for reducing latency overhead associated with direct encrypted memory. Here we propose
ciphertext speculation and MAC speculation that effectively hide decryption and integrity
verification latency by speculatively encrypting predictable values or pre-computing MACs
for predictable values and match the results against fetched encrypted data block or MACs.
In this study, we used a similar dynamic frequent value tracking mechanism as proposed
in [72], in which the most frequent values are dynamically determined. It can capture most
frequently encountered values in-between working set changes or software context switches.
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Figure 28: Timeline of Ciphertext Speculation
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5.2 Ciphertext Speculation
The rationale of ciphertext speculation includes the follows.
• The decryption latency of block cipher can be significant. It ranges from 50ns to a couple
of hundreds of nsec depending on the cipher, design methodology, area constraint, and
fabrication process [42, 26, 55, 19].
• Decryption of direct encrypted memory contains serialized operations including demand
fetch from memory and decryption of encrypted memory block.
• A large portion of data stored in memory and fetched from memory are predictable
values [72].
• It is easier to increase and maximize block cipher throughput than to reduce its la-
tency [26].
• For some block cipher such as Rijndael AES, encryption process is faster than decryption
process.
Figure 27 illustrates the principle of ciphertext speculation. To enable the prediction,
a few new microarchitectural functional blocks are introduced including a frequent value
table (FVT), Pipelined Encryption Engines, and an Encrypted Value Content-Addressable
Memory (CAM). The FVT keeps the top N most frequently used data values managed with
an LRU policy. In our experiments, N is either 8, 16 or 32. The ciphertext speculation
mechanism is illustrated in the timeline given in Figure 28. When data miss the on-die
L2 cache and needs to be fetched from memory, a fetch request is issued to the memory
controller and at the same time, a request is also posted to the ciphertext speculation
engine ( 1© in Figure 27). The engine will read all the frequent values from the FVT,
and send the data together with the fetch address to the encryption engine ( 2©), which will
encrypt them and store the resulting ciphertexts in the CAM ( 3©). Note that the encryption
engine is pipelined and replicated, thus multiple encryptions can be performed concurrently
to accelerate the value speculation. When the missed encrypted cache line arrives, it is
compared against the ciphertext waiting in the CAM ( 4©). If a match is found, the original
frequent value that corresponds to the matched ciphertext is returned and no decryption
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is needed ( 5© and 6©). Observing the timeline we should note that increasing the size of
the FVT does not necessarily lead to a better performance. Even though more hits in the
CAM will occur when more frequent values are kept inside the FVT, however, it needs
more time to encrypt these values, thus delaying the value speculation of subsequent misses
when there are several back-to-back L2 misses. Ciphertext predication applies to memory
encrypted using parallelizable encryption modes such as the one proposed by XOM [37].
In the next couple of sections, we consider two popular block cipher algorithms and
discuss how our ciphertext speculation applies to each of them.
5.2.1 Triple-DES/DES
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) has been a symmetric encryption standard for two
decades [48]. It encrypts a block of 64-bit message using a 56-bit secret key. In prac-
tice, a multiple encryption scheme based on DES, called Triple-DES is widely used [49]
for improved security. Triple-DES applies DES three times to achieve better effective key
length. Security of multiple encryption is proved in [45] and Triple-DES is the NIST ap-
proved replacement for DES in 1999. Applying ciphertext speculation to Triple-DES/DES
is straightforward because the prediction is made on each 64-bit data block, the same size
of Triple-DES/DES’ blocks. For each 64-byte cache line, the line is divided into 8 64-bit
chunks and each chunk is encrypted using parallelizable encryption modes with Triple-DES
as the block cipher. The granularity of value prediction is made for every fetched 64-bit
data. So, the size of each predicted ciphertext is also 64-bit. With pipelined design, all the
8 chunks of the same cache line can be encrypted or decrypted simultaneously.
5.2.2 AES
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encrypts a 128-bit block with variable key lengths
of 128-bit, 196-bit, or 256-bit. Since value prediction is performed for every 64-bit data1, to
predict each 128-bit ciphertext, combination of frequent values has to be used. For example,
if the number of 64-bit frequent/predictable values used is 8, then there are 64 possible
1Frequent value can also be dynamically tracked for 16 or 32-bit or even 128-bit values. But 64-bit is
close to the block size of AES encryption (128-bit). Profiling results show that using 128-bit as units of
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Figure 29: Data Chunk Re-ordering
combination of the eight frequent values, which gives 64 128-bit ciphertext speculations.
Although such a prediction scheme may work, the prediction rate would drop because it
requires both 64-bit values of each 128-bit chunk to be frequent or predictable. To solve
this problem, we propose a data chunk re-ordering mechanism that re-orders the eight data
chunks so that all chunks of more predictable values are grouped and encrypted together.
Figure 29 illustrates how the data chunk re-ordering is performed for each cache line. For
this example, there are eight 64-bit data chunks and four of them are frequent values (shaded
boxes). If a prediction is made for every two chunks, none of the four 128-bit ciphertext
can be predicted correctly. Nevertheless, if the chunks are re-ordered as shown below the
original data block, two of the four 128-bit ciphertext will be predictable.
To restore decrypted chunks back to the original order, a secure processor has to main-
tain additional information. One choice is to store a bitmap of frequent values. For a
64-byte cache line, the bitmap requires 8 bits to encode whether any of the eight 64-bit
chunk is a frequent value.
The bitmap associated with each memory block is encrypted also when stored in the
external memory. Since the bitmap contains only 8 bits per cache line, so bitmaps of several
memory blocks can be encrypted and stored together. Decrypted data chunks or correctly
predicted data chunks cannot be used if the secure processor cannot determine their original
order before the corresponding bitmap is decrypted. This performance problem can be
tackled in three ways. First, a small cache can be applied to cache bitmaps in the secure
processor. The overhead to cache bitmaps is very small. Considering a data TLB of 128
entries and 4KB page size, to cache the frequent value bitmaps for all the 128 pages requires
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an 8KB cache. In fact, instead of requiring more power or space, such frequent value bitmap
cache may save power or space. Since frequent values have less entropy, significant portion
of a cache line may be turned off or put into a lower power state knowing that many of the
chunks are frequent values. For example, given eight frequent values, if the frequent value
bitmap indicates that all the chunks of a cache line are frequent values, it requires only 24
bits (3 bits x 8) instead of 512 bits (64 bits x 8) for storing the cache line. Second, bitmaps
can be prefetched using simple hardware prefetch technique.
In summary, ciphertext speculation is practical for both AES based and Triple-DES
based direct memory block encryption. For the AES based design, frequent value bitmap
cache is preferred for better performance results. Considering that frequent value bitmap is
also a compression technique, introducing such bitmap cache may actually make the secure
processor more power efficient.
5.3 MAC Speculation
Similar to the ciphertext speculation, a secure processor can also speculatively compute
MACs for frequent value chunks. This requires each cipher size chunk to have it own MAC.
One performance advantage of assigning a MAC to each chunk is that it supports parallel
authentication of each individual memory chunk. When combined with parallelizable en-
cryption mode, a secure processor can decrypt and authenticate critical fetched chunk of a
cache line first before its trailing chunks. As aforementioned, a simple and secure design is
to have a secure processor to issue instructions and data only after they are authenticated.
Such design will not have the risk of disclosing sensitive information due to maliciously
altered instructions or data. To implement MAC speculation, a secure processor will com-
pute along with each speculated ciphertext to speculate its corresponding MAC value. The
speculated MAC will be matched against the MAC fetched from the memory. If both the
speculated ciphertext and the speculated MAC match with the fetched ciphertext and the
MAC, the secure processor knows that the fetched value is a frequent value and there is
no additional decryption and MAC verification required. Given that a large percentage of
fetched memory blocks contain frequent values, such technique can significantly reduce the
58
decryption and authentication overhead.
5.4 Security Analysis
It is important to point out that the proposed prediction technique is completely an archi-
tectural optimization. It does not change the security strength of the underlying encryption
modes and the MAC integrity check schemes, nor does it modify the original encryption
modes and the MAC schemes.
Some audience may have concerns that since there are so many frequent values in the
applications, memory encryption may not be able to provide sufficient protection against
statistical analysis of ciphertext. It is important to point out that proper application of
encryption modes will even out the frequency distribution. In theory, once encrypted, the
encrypted data will be evenly distributed, in other words, without any frequent value bias.
Thus frequent values in plaintext do not manifest itself in ciphertext. To further clarify
the confusion, even though our technique is named ciphertext speculation, by no means it
implies that the ciphertext or the plaintext is predictable by adversaries. Predictions are
made only by a secure processor within the secure boundary because the secure processor has
the complete knowledge of necessary information such as a secret key used for encryption
for creating ciphertext. Also note that we are not proposing any new security model or
new secure processor design paradigm but simply provides architecture enhancementon
top of existing security architectures to address the latency issues associated with memory
decryption and authentication.
5.5 Comparison With OTP Prediction
Cipher text prediction is another prediction based technique to hide latency overhead of
encrypted memory. It is based on the frequent value prediction [39, 72] and specifically
designed for memory encryption that uses parallelizable direct memory encryption mode
such as the well known OCB mode [54]. Different from the ciphertext prediction, the OTP
prediction does not predict the ciphertext itself.
The commonality of both techniques is that, both of them use idle cycles of pipelined
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Table 3: Compare counter prediction with Ciphertext speculation
Technique Supported Mode What is predicted Source of predictability
Counter prediction & counter-mode sequence numbers/pads predictability of memory
Decryption pad precomputing update frequency
Ciphertext/MAC prediction all modes ciphtertext itself frequent data chunk





L1 I-Cache DM, 8KB, 32B line
L1 D-Cache DM, 8KB, 32B line
L2 Cache 4way, Unified, 64B line, write back cache
256KB and 1MB
L1/L2 Latency 1 cycle / 4 cycles (256KB), 8 cycles (1MB)
Memory Bus 200MHz, 8B wide
Memory Latency X-5-5-5 (core clocks)
X depends on page status
CAS latency 20 mem bus clocks
Precharge latency (RP) 7 mem bus clocks
RAS-to-CAS (RCD) latency 7 mem bus clocks
Triple-DES latency 96ns, 48 stages
AES latency 80ns
crypto engines to speculatively compute either pads (the OTP prediciton) or ciphertexts
(the ciphertext prediction) themselves that can hide decryption latency of encrypted memory.
But the two techniques also differ from each other significantly. Different from the ciphertext
prediction, the OTP prediction does not predict the ciphertext itself. Table 3 shows some
difference between the OTP prediction and the ciphertext prediction.
5.6 Simulation Framework
Our simulation framework is based on SimpleScalar [13] running SPEC2000 INT and FP
Alpha binaries compiled with -O3 option. We implemented architecture support for dy-
namic frequent value tracking [72] and our ciphertext speculation scheme. The architectural
parameters used for performance evaluation are listed in Table 5.6. Each benchmark is
fast-forwarded and simulated at representative places according to SimPoint [56] for 400M
instructions in performance mode. During the fast-forwarding, the L1 caches, the L2 cache,
and the frequent value tracking are simulated. We subset the simulations for those with
high L2 misses and memory throughput requirements.
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5.7 Performance Analysis
In this section we summarize and analyze performance results of our ciphertext speculation
technique. The results are collected for two L2 cache settings, 256KB and 1MB. The choice
of a smaller L2 cache is critical for our analysis, because protection on data confidentiality
is not only deemed for high-end systems but commodity platforms as well. Note that a
very large L2 size for SPEC2000 may be inappropriate in evaluating our technique since
the entire working set of most SPEC2000 benchmarks can easily fit into a very large L2.
5.7.1 Frequent Values
Figure 30 shows the value predictability of each 64-bit memory chunk fetched due to L2
misses using 8, 16, and 32 frequent values. For several benchmarks, the prediction rate on
average is over 40% or higher. Some benchmarks such as 164.gzip shows poor prediction rate.
Note that the relationship between ciphertext predictability and IPC is rather complicated
and by no means proportional to the ciphertex predictability. It is not guaranteed that
every 64-bit data chunk fetched to L2 will be accessed because memory fetch is based on
cache line size. For example, a piece of predictable data might be fetched into the processor
because data adjacent to it mapped to the same cache line is accessed by the processor.
Despite being predictable, the predictability of this un-used data may contribute little to
the performance.
Figure 31 shows the advantages of using data chunk re-ordering for frequent value
prediction. When the hardware uses a block cipher whose encryption size is 128-bit and
one 64-bit frequent value is encrypted together with a 64-bit non-frequent value, the pre-
dictability is lost. Since a memory line often contains several frequent value data chunks,
the hardware will re-arrange the data chunks so that frequent value data chunks are ad-
jacent to each other. If a block cipher encrypts two 64-bit frequent value data chunks,
both of them can be predicted. Figure 31 compares the ratios of predictable data chunks
out of the total number of frequent value data chunks with and without the data chunk
re-arrangement under 128-bit encryption unit size. According to the figures, without any





































































































































































































































Figure 31: Percentage of Predictable Data Chunks Over All Frequent Value Data Chunks
Under 128-bit Block Cipher
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cipher. But when the re-arrangement is applied, over 95% 64-bit frequent value data chunks
are predictable.
5.7.2 Ciphertext and MAC Speculation
Under parallelizable encryption modes, ciphertext and MAC speculation can be performed
independently for each chunk of a cache line. In this section, we investigate the performance
impact of ciphertext and MAC speculation. For TDES, a prediction is made on per 64-bit
memory chunk of a cache line; for AES, each prediction is made on per 128-bit memory
chunk using memory chunk re-ordering. We use a set of 8 64-bit frequent memory chunks
dynamically tracked with an approach similar to that in [72].
The performance improvement of ciphertext and MAC speculation is shown in figure 32
and figure 33 for TDES and AES, both directly encrypt memory. Apparently, frequent value
based speculation improves performance for most benchmarks under both cipher conditions.
For some memory-bound applications such as 181.mcf, 175.vpr, 172.mgrid, the improvement
is more significant. For about eight benchmarks, the IPC speedup is over 10% for both
TDES and AES. In general, using 64-bit speculation chunk achieves more performance
improvement than the 128-bit speculation chunk. This is because 128-bit based speculation
generates more speculations and is more likely to saturate the crypto engine with speculative
encryption requests. When the L2 is increased to 1MB, the IPC improvement, as expected,
decreases. But still for six benchmarks, the speedup is at least 10% and some of them attain
almost 30%. Note that when the cache size is increased to 1MB, most of the memory bound
SPEC2000 benchmark programs are no longer memory bound.
Figure 34 studies the performance impact of MAC speculation on memory encryption
using the counter mode encryption. Unlike direct encryption modes, the counter mode
receives less benefit from ciphertext speculation. That is because in the counter mode,
pre-computation of decryption pads is the dominating factor of decryption performance.
But the counter mode can still take advantage of frequent value based MAC speculation
by significantly reducing authentication latency. The results indicate that many bench-
















































































(b) AES, 256KB L2
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Figure 34: IPC Speedup Using Ciphertext and MAC Speculation For Counter Mode)
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IPC speedup over 10%. Under 1M L2 size, some benchmarks such as 181.mcf, 172.mgrid,
197.parser also attain significant IPC speedup from 15% to 20%.
5.7.3 Sensitivity of Memory Latency
Essentially, frequent value based ciphertext and MAC speculation is a latency hiding tech-
nique. In this subsection, we evaluate its effectiveness under different settings of memory
speed. Since our simulation is based on detailed SDRAM model, there is no single absolute
memory fetch latency. The relative speed between CPU and memory is captured by the
CPU-to-memory clock ratio. We experimented three different CPU memory clock ratio
settings. They are 1:4, 1:5, and 1:6. Higher ratios infer longer memory fetch latencies.
Figure 32 and figure 33 show the results under 1:5 ratio. Figure 35 shows the impact of
memory latency on the effectiveness of ciphertext and MAC speculation under 1:4 and 1:6
CPU-to-memory clock ratios. First, the results indicate that ciphertext and MAC specu-
lation is quite effective under all the three settings. For each benchmark, the differences
of IPC improvement rates under the three settings are relatively insignificant. This shows
robustness of the proposed frequent value based prediction technique. Second, the results
show that on average ciphertext speculation improves IPC more under larger CPU memory
clock ratios. The average IPC speedup of all the benchmarks under 1:4 ratio is about 7.5%
and the average IPC speedup of all the benchmarks under 1:6 ratio is close to 9%.
5.7.4 Number of Frequent Values
To evaluate the performance sensitivity with respect to the size of the Frequent Value Table
(FVT), we increased the number of frequent values, i.e. the number of entries, stored inside
the FVT from 8 to 16 and 32. Ideally, more entries should produce more predictions of the
missed ciphertext. As explained earlier, however, they can also throttle the performance
due to much more encryption work that needs to be done for each L2 miss when a series
of back-to-back L2 misses occur. Figure 36 shows the IPC results for TDES encrypted
memory. As indicated, there is little improvement with more entries in the FVT In some
cases, the performance was even reduced a little bit because the number of predictions is too















































































(b) CPU-to-Memory Ratio 1:6








































Figure 36: Effect of number of guesses/per chunk on performance with TDES encrypted
memory, 256K L2
at the cost of increasing workload on the speculative encryption engine, which potentially
increases the latency to generate encrypted frequent values for the succeeding misses. For
AES based scheme, the cost and workload to use more frequent values is higher than TDES
based scheme because it uses combination of frequent values. Since increasing the number
of frequent values and predictions does not have a significant performance advantage, we
did not evaluate its effect on the AES based scheme.
5.8 Conclusion
Minimizing the latency overhead of memory decryption and integrity verification is a crucial
issue for designing a high performance secure processor. We propose novel latency-hiding
techniques — frequent value ciphertext speculation and frequent value MAC speculation to
hide decryption and MAC authentication latency. Ciphertext speculation reduces or elimi-
nates the decryption latency by speculatively encrypting frequent values and matching their
ciphertext results with the fetched one. Our simulation profile indicates that on average over
40% fetched data values are frequent values. By exploiting these properties, the decryption
latency for secure processors using direct memory encryption modes can be substantially
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reduced. We also propose MAC speculation which pre-computes MAC for frequent values
and can accelerate authentication process by comparing the speculated MAC with the cor-
responding MAC fetched from the memory. MAC speculation improves performance for all
memory encryption schemes including the counter mode security architecture that supports
parallel MAC verification. As shown in our experiments, memory bound benchmark pro-
grams show significant IPC improvements using ciphertext speculation and MAC speculaiton
with speedup ranging from 10% to 30%.
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CHAPTER VI
EFFICIENT MEMORY INTEGRITY VERIFICATION
For guaranteeing a tamper-proof computing environment, any unauthorized modification
attempt to the applications running on the system must be detected via a robust integrity
verification mechanism. In addition to its effectiveness, the hardware support for a tamper-
proof computing environment needs to be transparent to the users. Toward this goal,
we propose a scheme called MACTree integrity protection. We describe the integrity tree
construction and analyze its security and efficiency in this chapter.
6.1 MACTree Construction
The proposed integrity checking scheme, MACTree, uses 32-bit Message Authentication
Code (MAC) nodes to construct the m-ary hash tree used in prior art. Note that a con-
ventional MAC requires at least 128-bit to ensure a sufficient security level. However, using
128-bit MAC nodes suffers a substantial performance loss due to a large number of hash
computations and storage overhead. Therefore, MACTree has to be signed carefully to
attain the best balance between performance and security.
A MACTree is constructed by the following steps.
• A 32-bit MAC value for each cache line is generated as shown in Figure 37. First of
all, an initial 256-bit MAC value is generated using the SHA-256 hash function [50]
by concatenating the cache line data, its virtual address, and the secret key of the
application as inputs. A new 32-bit MAC is then computed by XORing the eight
evenly-divided chunks;
• All 32-bit MACs form one layer of nodes in the MACTree and are stored linearly as
shown in the left-hand side of Figure 38. For this layer, a new MAC line is made by
concatenating (m-1) consecutive MACs together and padded with a 32-bit Random
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Figure 37: 32-bit MAC Generation for a Cache Line
cache line cache line
RIV MAC
cache line cache line cache linecache line








Bounday, RM needs to be encrypted
When evicted outside Protection
Encrypted RM value (same size)
MACTree in Plaintext within Protection Boundary
Figure 38: Structure of the MACTree in plaintext within protection boundary. Note that
a hash value needs to be encrypted when being evicted out of the protection domain.
Initial Value (RIV) which is generated by a random number generator using thermal
noise in the processor core [29].
• Similar to the method described in Figure 37, a new 32-bit MAC value for the next
level in the MACTree is computed by concatenating the new MAC line and the secret
key of the application as the inputs to the SHA-256 function.
• Repeat the last two steps until a root MAC is generated.
Whenever a MAC line is to be cast out of protection boundary, the MAC line is encrypted
by the AES block cipher as illustrated in the dashed box of Figure 38. Note that the root
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MAC is always kept inside the processor once the program enters the security environment
to avoid any potential tampering.
6.2 Security Analysis
The CHTree scheme [23] in AEGIS was designed for protecting the integrity of an appli-
cation by constructing an m-ary hash tree. The integrity check of a cache line using the
hash tree costs logm(L) hashing computations, assuming there are L data cache lines in the
application. The latency overhead is substantial according to simulation results. MACTree
scheme differs from the CHTree scheme in three aspects: 1)32-bit MAC values are used
instead of 128-bit hash values; 2)The MACtree is encrypted using the secret key of a given
application; 3) Each MAC line is computed from its (m-1) children lines with a random
initial value generated randomly by circuits. These features reinforce and guarantee the
security of the proposed MACTree scheme albeit the MAC’s shorter bit length of 32.
Using our proposed MAC instead of simple hash values can prevent an adversary from
producing a collision using independent computing devices. For instance, with a 32-bit
hash value, an adversary can combine arbitrary instructions into a cache line to generate a
matched 32-bit hash value. This task can be performed in any computer as computing hash
values does not need any assistance from the victim computer. When the same hash value
of a target instruction cache line is found with the worst case of 232 tries [3], the adversary
can replace the line with his fabricated instructions. Now, the integrity check will fail to
detect such an attack. MACTree does not suffer from such an attack because there is a
secret key involved in deriving the MAC value. This secret key is processor and application
specific.
An adversary has to launch brute force crack on the victim machine. This is one of
the major differences between MACTree and CHTree in terms of security strength. An
adversary could modify cache line data of a victim processor directly without touching the
MACTree. But the chance for this activity to be undetected by the processor architecture is
2−32. To enhance security, the processor of MACTree architecture will stop the execution of
the application once an integrity verification failed, prohibiting the adversary from further
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attempted attacks. Moreover, the security can introduce artificial small amount of delay
between integrity verification failure and resumed execution when the number of integrity
verification failures is frequent. Albeit the size of MAC is only 32-bit, if only one minute
minimal resume latency is introduced for frequent integrity failures under brute force crack,
it would take hundreds of years for an adversary to comprise MACTree protection, which
is sufficient in terms of security strength.
One possible threat of using 32-bit MACs is the higher probability of aliasing. That is,
given two cache lines, the possibility that they have the same MAC value is 2−32. Although
the probability of aliasing appears to be small, it might become a loophole when a huge
number of cache lines and their MACs are generated and compared by the adversary given he
can access data and the associated MACs in the external memory. The MACTree prevents
this type of attacks by associating an RIV with each MACTree line and encrypting the line
with the application’s secret key. Since the MACTree is encrypted, an adversary will be
unable to tell whether their plaintext MACs are the same.
6.2.0.1 Efficiency Analysis
Here we analyze the advantage of the MACTree over the CHTree. First of all, a 256-bit
cache line can hold 7 nodes in the MACTree versus 2 nodes in the CHTree. Hence the
height of the tree is reduced to log7L nodes from log2L, or a 180% reduction of the number
of nodes needing to be examined. Nonetheless, the MACTree incurs decryption overheads
caused by encryption. Assume that the decryption delay is Td and the memory access
delay is Tm. The overhead caused by memory access and decryption for integrity check is
log7L× (Td +Tm) in the MACTree against log2L×Tm in the CHTree scheme. Let Td = Tm2 ,
similar to the assumption used in other secure processor architectures, the MACTree has
47% less overhead than the CHTree. Even when Td = Tm, the MACTree has 35% less
overhead. The MACTree scheme can be further improved by caching nodes within the
protected boundary. With the same cache size, the MACTree can hold 3.5 times more
nodes.
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Table 5: Processor Model Parameters
Parameters Values
Frequency 1.0 GHz
L1 I/D Cache DM, 8KB, 32B line
L2 Cache 4W, Unified, 32B line,
256KB, 0.5MB, 1MB, 2MB
L1 Latency 1 cycle
L2 Latency
256KB/512KB/1MB/2MB 6/8/10/12 cycles
Memory Latency X-5-5-5 (cpu cycles)
X depends on mem page status






MAC Length 32 bits
RIV/MAC 64 bits
RM Cache 4W, 8KB, 32B line
MAC Cache 4W, 8KB, 32B line
RM Cache Lat. 6 cycles
MAC Cache Lat. 6 cycles
6.3 Performance Analysis
6.3.1 Memory overhead
Integrity checking schemes need additional memory space to store the checksums. In the
MACTree scheme, the additional memory space needed is approximately 1(m−1) of the data
memory space with an m-ary balanced MACTree. As we use a 256-bit cache line and a 32-
bit MAC value, the memory overhead is about 15%. In contrast, a 128-bit hash value used
in the CHTree scheme will result in a 100% memory overhead. The M-TREE encryption
scheme uses a 64-bit RM value for each cache line, leading to 25% memory overhead for
encryption, larger than 12% in a direct block cipher that uses 32-bit random initial values,
but can achieve a better performance.
6.3.2 Simulation framework
Our simulation work is based on SimpleScalar [6] running Alpha binaries compiled with -03
option. Each benchmark is fast-forwarded according to SimPoint’s suggestion [56]. During
fast-forwarding, L1 and L2 caches were warmed up. table 11 summaries the architectural
and microarchitectural parameters. Both SPEC2000 INT and FP benchmarks were used
for our evaluation.
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6.3.3 Unverified Instruction Speculation
Speculative execution can be employed to further improve the performance for the MAC-
TREE secure processors. The results of unverified instructions can be speculatively con-
sumed by dependent instructions without stalling the pipeline. However, all the unverified
instructions and their dependent instructions must not be committed before the correspond-
ing integrity checks are completed. The Reorder Buffer can be used to satisfy this need with
a minor modification which adds the verification completion as a condition for retirement.
In other words, in addition to branches, the machine states induced by instructions with
pending integrity checks are also considered speculative.
6.3.4 Performance Results
In this subsection, we briefly summarized the performance results.
6.3.4.1 Performance comparison with the CHTree
Figure 39 compares the performance of the MACTree and the CHTree under two different L2
cache sizes. The IPC numbers were normalized to the baseline1. The results clearly show
the performance advantage of the MACTree scheme over the CHTree. The performance
overhead over the baseline for the MACtree scheme is 8% on average and up to 14% in the
worst case, while the CHTree scheme has 50% slowdown on average and as much as 60%
overhead in the worst case with a 256KB L2 cache. Even with a 2MB L2, the performance
degradation of the CHTree is reduced to 35% in the worst case and 11% on average, still
less efficient than the MACTree scheme which shows an overhead of 5% on average and 10%
in the worst case.
The performance advantage of the MACTree is twofold. As shown in Figure 40(a), with
an 8K MAC cache and a 256KB L2 cache, the MACTree has a much less number of MAC
cache accesses than the CHTree. It can be seen that the number of accesses to the MAC
cache in the MACTree are reduced to less than half of those in the CHTree for all cases.
On the other hand, since the same cache capacity will hold more nodes for the MACTree,
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(b) 8KB MAC cache, cache hit rates


































Figure 41: Performance sensitivity of MAC cache sizes of MACTree (256KB L2)
the cache hit rate is also significantly higher as shown in Figure 40(b).
6.3.4.2 Performance sensitivity of the MAC cache size
Now we investigate the performance sensitivity of using different MAC cache sizes for the
MACTree. The normalized IPC results are shown in Figure 41 for four difference MAC
caches including a perfect MAC cache, a transparent security support representing the
baseline. As shown, even for a MAC cache as small as 8KB, the performance with integrity
check can approach closely to the baseline. The 8-32KB MAC cache can hold a sufficient
number of nodes for the MACTree in order to exploit temporal locality and thus achieve a
high hit rate.
6.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we described a MACTree processor architecture that implements integrity
protection for providing a tamper-resistant and tamper-evident computing environment. We
analyzed security and efficiency of the proposed integrity checking scheme and against the
existing techniques and show that the MACTree architecture offers a significant performance
improvement as well as security advantages over the prior art. Based on our simulation
results, it is shown that the MACTree scheme suffers much less performance degradation
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in data integrity verification than the previously proposed CHTree scheme. Our worst case
overhead of 14% is substantially lower than the worst case overhead of 60% reported in the
published literature. In conclusion, the MACTree integrity verification design offers several
performance advantages over the existing secure processor architectures while retaining a
high level of security for protecting applications. In the next chapter, we will continue to
discuss how to combine integrity checking logic with decryption logic both efficiently and
securely in secure processor architecture.
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CHAPTER VII
DECOUPLING INTEGRITY VERIFICATION AND
DECRYPTION
It has been known to the security community that memory fetch is an information leakage
channel that if exploited by the hackers can potentially disclose sensitive information and
data. At the very beginning, the presence of such an information disclose channel in secure
processor does not seem to impose an imminent or significant threat [37]. At least, the po-
tential disclose of sensitive information through program control flow that can be partially
recovered through tracking of memory fetch is addressable in accordance with large body of
compiler research that use static analysis and strong typed flow safe langauge to mitigate
the problem [16, 47]. However, in-depth study shows another picture. Improper disasso-
ciation of decryption and authentication imposes a far more greater threat to software and
data confidentiality. Such disassociation potentially allows unverified or unauthenticated
programs to be speculatively executed and allows them to leave memory footprints. It
hands to the hackers a valuable tool for them to tamper the protected data or software
and disclose whatever information at their wish through the memory fetch side channel.
Static compiler analysis and safe language provide virtually no help to counter this exploit
because it tampers binary code and occurs at runtime.
In this chapter, we explore the design space of decryption and authentication disassoci-
ation with the objective to find a solution that is secure, fast, and simple to implement. In
terms of how to integrate authentication and decryption into a modern out-of-order proces-
sor pipeline, we study both the trade-off between the security and the complexity, and the
trade-off between the security and the performance. We investigate and evaluate a range
of designs from authentication-then-issue, authentication-then-commit, authentication-then-
write, and authentication-then-fetch. Under authentication-then-issue, a secure proces-
sor does not issue instructions whose integrity has not been fully verified. In addition,
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authentication-then-issue requires that fetched data be issued as operand only after the se-
cure processor has authenticated their integrity. Authentication-then-issue is a conservative
solution that allows almost no decryption and authentication disassociation and has negligi-
ble design complexity. The downside is that it may incur significant performance overhead.
Authentication-then-commit is a straight-forward solution that speculatively issues unveri-
fied instructions and data to the processor pipeline and commits the finished instructions
only after both the instruction itself and its operands are authenticated. Though seemingly
secure, authentication-then-commit leaves significant security loopholes in an out-of-order
processor because the speculatively executed memory fetches may disclose sensitive data
through the memory fetch address side-channel if they are based on the altered instructions
or data. Another solution offering even weaker security is authentication-then-write. Under
this design, all permanent changes to memory state have to be made based on the results
derived from authenticated instructions and operands. Though this design guarantees the
authenticity of the results produced, it leaves significant security holes and puts confiden-
tiality of both data and software at great risk. Authentication-then-fetch allows bus cycles
to be granted to a memory fetch if only all the instructions and data that the memory fetch
depends on according to data and control dependency have been authenticated and verified.
7.1 Memory Fetch as Information Disclosing Channel
Whenever there is a security system, there will be attempts to break it. History proves
that it is often the case of underestimating the hacker’s dedication and skill to compromise
security protection instead of the other way around. Considering that secure processor is
designed for countering physical tamper and one of the main applications is anti reverse-
engineering of military embedded or security system, its security strength should never be
taken for granted and in-depth study of potential exploits and risk assessment are not sim-
ply optional. For reverse engineering military embedded systems and software, motivated
opponents may mobilize significant resources and expertise.
In a secure processor, since both the software and data are encrypted, memory fetch
becomes one main source of information to the hackers. The reason is that memory fetch
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address shown on the front side interface between a secure processor and memory module
is not encrypted. Encrypting fetch address is neither practicable nor necessary because as
long as the system uses regular unprotected DRAM, the adversaries can always eavesdrop at
the final interface where fetch address is not encrypted. The disclosed fetch address in some
extreme scenario allows a hacker to re-construct program control flow and even to recover
sensitive data such as security keys [75, 76]. Compiler researchers have investigated this
issue with a focus on static program analysis and flow safe language design [16, 47]. Such
intellectual efforts though helpful for understanding how this side-channel may be exploited
by the hackers to compromise security in a secure processor environment, they are far
from being sufficient to guide secure processor design practice because most of the compiler
research have been carried out under completely different assumptions and objective.
7.1.1 Threat Model
Almost all the previous compiler research adopts a natural execution threat model where
memory fetch addresses (both data and code fetch) during natural execution of a program
may comprise a side-channel for leaking sensitive information. Given this threat assump-
tion, most past research have focused on compiler based static analysis. In those studies,
authenticity and integrity of software and data are less a security concern. For secure
processor design, the story would be different. For attaining high performance, a modern
out-of-order processor may speculatively issue and execute instructions, speculatively fetch
instructions and data. Such aggressive speculative execution when combined with secure
processor design featuring disassociation of decryption and authentication may bring poten-
tial new security risks. Adversaries may deliberately alter software or data in some specific
way and the altered software or data if executed or used speculatively by an out-of-order
processor pipeline may disclose sensitive information through the memory fetch side chan-
nel. This more active form of exploit presents a more serious threat because static compiler
analysis or safe programming practice lends almost no help to mitigate the post compilation
runtime tampering.
Given that software and data are protected with secure processor using encryption, there
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are potentially several ways to trick the secure processor to disclose sensitive data through
the memory fetch side-channel. Most of these exploits involve tampering and altering of
the protected software or data. An adversary may resort to one or a combination of the
following techniques to achieve such a purpose.
7.1.1.1 Bit flip
Most standard encryption modes including the CBC mode, the counter mode and many
other modes are malleable. A malleable encryption mode is a mode where flipping certain
bits in cipher-text will induce certain bits of the decrypted plaintext to flip. In the counter-
mode, flipping a particular cipher-text bit will make the same bit of the corresponding
plaintext to flip. In the CBC mode, flipping a cipher-text bit will induce flipping of plaintext
bit at certain offset depending on the encryption unit size of the underlying cipher. Through
bit flipping, an adversary may transform a piece of protected software or data so that the
altered code or data will either directly or indirectly disclose sensitive information to the
side-channel. It is a standard practice to provide non-malleability to malleable encryption
mode by adding authentication [18]. However, disassociation between decryption and
authentication in an out-of-order processor leaves security holes that is big enough for the
hackers to maneuver. Authentication and integrity verification may lag behind decryption
with a latency ranging from tens of cycles to even hundreds of cycles. This provides an
execution window where tens of unverified instructions or even more may be speculatively
executed without being verified. In general, those speculatively executed instructions are not
allowed to modify processor and memory state before they reach the commit stage. However,
memory fetches are not state change operations. A standard out-of-order processor will
grant bus cycles to speculative memory fetches before the commit stage. This makes memory
fetch a side-channel.
An adversary can accelerate bit flipping attack using frequency analysis. According
to the profile study [36, 72], application’s memory space comprises significant amount of
predictable or frequent plaintext values. An adversary can exploit the disproportional dis-
tribution of binary values to speed up bit flipping attack. For example, significant amount of
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memory data in an application’s memory space are zeros. Using this fact, an adversary can
tamper a piece of ciphertext bits through bit flipping with the assumption that its plaintext
are zeros. If the percentage of zero values is 30%, which is true for many applications, then
the adversary will have 30% tampering success rate.
7.1.1.2 Replay attack
Apart from bit flipping, an adversary may use replay attack as a tampering method. Under
this attack, an adversary replaces a piece of protected data with replayed old information.
For example, if a protected function generates a random seed each time it is invoked and has
the seed encrypted when stored in the external RAM. An adversary may log the encrypted
seed. Next time, when the function is called again, the adversary may replace the new
encrypted seed with the logged old seed to force the program to behave in a way predicable
by the adversary. Replay attack imposes many security risks. Some general solutions to
mitigate replay attack are Merkel hash tree or MAC tree [44] that authenticates the entire
RAM as a whole. When authentication is decoupled from decryption, so is Merkel hash
tree or MAC tree verification. Again the lag between data is decrypted and authenticated
by Merkel tree or MAC tree provides rooms for the adversaries to exploit.
7.1.2 Exploit Taxonomy
In this subsection, we will briefly describe some of the exploits of the memory fetch side-
channel for breaking data confidentiality protection provided by a secure processor. It is
worth pointing out that the list given below is by no means comprehensive and they may
represent only a small portion what an adversary can do by exploiting the fetch address
side-channel. Except natural disclose that has been described in early this section, all other
exploits are described below.
7.1.2.1 Pointer Conversion
The basic idea of pointer conversion exploit is to convert a piece of encrypted sensitive data
into pointer such that its value will be automatically disclosed to the side-channel. There















































Figure 43: Binary Search Tamper
attack” to illustrate how to recover encrypted data by only altering program data. Link-list
is widely used in software program. One property of link-list is that the last node is always
terminated with a NULL pointer. Assume that the adversary knows where the link-list ends
(the last node). Then, the NULL pointer becomes a known plaintext. Further assume that
there is a secret data value x stored in memory location l, which the adversary wants to
recover. The adversary can alter the NULL pointer into l - node size + 4 so that the secret
data becomes a node pointer, see Figure 42. When the link-list is traversed, the program
will try to use the secret data as a node pointer and issue a corresponding memory load
which may reveal its value to the side-channel. There are many ways for an adversary to
recover memory locations of sensitive data. For example, an adversary can run a local copy
of the same system and discover the likely position where sensitive data may be stored [35].
An adversary may also reverse engineer the software first and find out memory location of


















Figure 44: Binary Search Exploit Based on String Comparison
7.1.2.2 Binary Search
If there is some comparison that compares some secret data with some constant stored in
memory and the constant value is known by an adversary. The adversary may launch so
called binary search exploit. The adversary may alter the constant value in power-of-2 basis
and eavesdrop how the modification will affect the comparison result (control flow). If the
secret data is 32-bit long, according to the principle of binary search, at most log2(232)
= 32 trials are enough to recover the sensitive data. Figure 43 illustrates such process.
Alternatively, the adversary may tamper string comparisons and string constants. An
adversary may combine this exploit with the pointer conversion exploit to force sensitive
data to be compared with some constant, see Figure 44 for an example.
Binary search exploit requires tampering of constant or string values. To launch bit
flipping attack on constant or strings, an adversary must first recover their plaintext values.
This would not be too difficult because lots of strings or constants are either outputs that
can be eavesdropped or input supplied by the users.
7.1.2.3 Disclosing Kernel
Disclosing kernel is a short piece of malicious code that will disclose possibly arbitrary data
to the side-channel. The simplest disclosing kernel comprising only two RISC instructions
is one that loads some arbitrary data into a secure processor, then use the data as fetch
address. An adversary may insert a disclosing kernel into either code space or data space by
tampering either code or data using bit flipping. Then by altering one more instruction or
function return address, the adversary can hijack program control to the disclosing kernel. A
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slightly sophisticated version of disclosing kernel such as one that has a loop can potentially
disclose the entire application’s memory space to the side-channel.
Inserting a disclosing kernel into an application’s code space is in fact much easier than
people thought. An adversary needs to first guess or recover a short sequence of encrypted
instructions’ plaintext whose size is large enough to hold the disclosing kernel. This in fact
is not a very hard task. Instructions even in encrypted format are highly predictable or
recoverable due to the following reasons.
• Invariant code sequence. Compiler always does code generation in a predictable way.
The binary codes produced by a compiler comprise many short code sequences that
are either invariant or predictable. Such invariant or predictable short code sequence
can be found in program’s entry point, function epilogue or prologue, compiled loop
structure and etc. An adversary can replace one of those predictable or invariant code
sequences with a disclosing kernel.
• Frequency analysis. A program compiled in typical RISC format contains 7% nop,
28% load/store, and 6.6% branch instructions [36]. An adversary has 7%, 28%,
and 6.6% success rate of guessing some randomly encrypted instruction to be a nop,
a load/store or a branch. In another word, if the adversary flips the bits of some
encrypted instruction to transform the decrypted instruction into a load or branch
instruction with the assumption that the original decrypted instruction is a nop, the
adversary has on average 7% success rate. A straight forward attack is to replace
a NOP with a control transfer instruction to hijack program flow into a disclosing
kernel.
• Instruction reverse engineering. Instructions even encrypted can be reverse engineered
by an adversary. For example, it is not too difficult for the adversary to reverse
engineer branch instructions because of their memory access footprint and launch the
bit flipping attacks to transform the reverse-engineered branches into something else.
As long as an adversary can reverse engineer a short sequence of instructions, it is
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Figure 45: Alpha Instruction Format
Inserting a disclosing kernel into application’s data space could also be a very simple
task because of the existence of frequent data values [72]. Research shows that large
percentage of data values are zeros. An adversary may have a very high success rate of
inserting a disclose kernel into a counter mode encrypted memory space by simply XORing
the disclosing kernel with ciphertext whose plaintext is most likely to be zeros. If a disclosing
kernel is inserted into data space, the adversary needs to hijack the program control flow
into the disclosing kernel.
7.1.2.4 Data-to-code/Code-to-code Conversion
Program execution, especially executing of branches or data fetch instructions often leaves
memory footprint that can be exploited by an adversary to reverse engineer and recover
encrypted sensitive data or instructions. The objective of data-to-code conversion or code-
to-code conversion exploit is to transform sensitive data or instructions that do not have
memory footprint into instructions that have through either brute force or random sub
instruction bit flipping. As a result, part or complete of the sensitive data or the original
instructions can be disclosed.
This attack exploits some of the vulnerabilities of the RISC instruction set. They are,
• Regular Size. All the instructions have the same length and in many cases they are
short, 16 bits, 24 bits, or 32 bits;
• Regular Format. The instructions are well formatted (e.g. fixed opcode field) for
reducing decoding logic complexity. For example, bit[31:26] of Alpha ISA is fixed as
the opcode, see figure 45.
• Reduced ISA Number. RISC philosophy advocates a small set of instructions instead
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Table 6: Exploit Comparison
Exploit Tamper Prevention Requirement
Natural Disclose recover control flow from execution trace flow safe language,
compiler static analysis
Pointer Conversion data tamper, convert data into pointer authenticate fetch address
before granting bus cycle
Binary Search data tamper, alter constant value branch/memory fetch shall
depend on authenticated data/code
Disclosing Kernel data/code tamper, authenticate fetch address
jump into malicious code kernel before granting bus cycle
Data-to-code/ data/code tamper, authenticate branch
Code-to-code Conversion sub-instruction tamper before granting bus cycle
of a large number of complex instructions. This also reduces the search space of
brute-force attack.
One risk associated with RISC is that it allows brute force and incremental guess using
sub instruction bit flipping. In data-to-code or code-to-code conversion exploit, an adversary
divides each instruction size data into fields (opcode, operand one, operand two, and etc.)
and launches brute-force guess piece by piece on each field of the targeted instruction. For
example, if the opcode is only 6 bits long, it requires only 26=64 trial and error to transform
a random encrypted data value into a jump instruction. The rest bits of the data are treated
as displacement and its value can be eavesdropped through the fetch address side-channel.
In another word, data-to-code or code-to-code conversion exploit may allow an adversary
to recover an encrypted data value or instruction in the order of 64 trials in ideal case. A
detailed description and demonstration of this exploit can be found in [59].
It is important to keep in mind that some of the aforementioned exploits apply equally
to the degenerated scenarios such as only confidentiality of data or only confidentiality of
code is protected.
7.1.3 Impact of Virtual Memory Translation
The aforementioned exploit cases represent an ideal situation where sensitive data always
shows up directly as memory fetch address. Many high performance processors use virtual
address translation. A piece of sensitive data when used as fetch address may map into
invalid address space and trigger memory translation exception. It is worth pointing out
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Figure 46: Shift Window
exploits can be applied straight-forwardly. On the other hand, the aforementioned exploits
such as pointer conversion, disclosing kernel and etc are still effective when a secure proces-
sor uses virtual memory address translation. First, an adversary may try to disable virtual
address translation if it is possible. Second, an adversary may try to tamper the address
translation table to fool the system and avoid translation fault. Third, many processors
throw exception and log the faulty address. For example, Windows OS throws a window
that displays the invalid address to the user. If this is the case, an adversary can recover
the sensitive data easily by reading the log or displayed address. If all the above do not
work, an adversary can use the following two techniques,
7.1.3.1 Shift window and page address mask
For most processors, the page size is at least 4K bytes. This means that the lower 12 bits
of a 32-bit address will not be affected by address translation. An adversary can use a
shift window to recover 12 bits each time, see Figure 46. For the high bits, the adversary
can mask them out to make sure that the result can always be translated. Given that a
piece of sensitive data is stored in a register, the adversary can mask out or transform the
page address before the data is used as fetch address. This requires tampering of binary
instructions. As aforementioned, binary codes of applications comprise instructions that
can be recovered or reverse engineered. After reverse engineer, an adversary can mold the
recovered instructions into other instructions such as instruction to mask out or transform
the page address. A disclosing kernel may also mask out the page address first and then
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uses the result as fetch address.
7.1.3.2 Brute force or random page address tampering
If all the aforementioned techniques fail, the adversary can resort to brute force or random
page address tampering. For example, in pointer conversion exploit, the adversary may
either randomly or systematically flip ciphertext bits that map to page address. Assume
that the page address size is 20 bits and the application has 100MB memory space mapped
with virtual address translation. Using brute force or random page address tampering, the
adversary on average has a chance of one out of about 40 (220/(100MB/4KB)) trials to
have some random data correctly translated. Considering the disproportional distribution
of frequent or predictable values, an adversary can speed up the process by playing with
frequent or predictable values.
7.1.4 Effect of Cache
The existence of on-chip cache may impact the effectiveness of some of the exploits afore-
mentioned. Cache reduces a program’s memory footprint. However, an adversary can use
the following techniques to reduce cache’s effect on tampering,
• Disable cache. Most processors allow a local user to disable cache through resetting
BIOS.
• Uncachable memory. An adversary can tamper with memory attributes and mark
certain memory range as uncachable.
• Fake coherent signal. Most of today’s processors support bus snoop based cache-
coherence protocol. It is possible for an adversary to insert fake DMA (direct memory
access) requests causing a processor to mark a cache line as shared and write the data
back each time it is updated or reload a tampered data value. Such attack involves
building a device that is able to insert false coherent memory read/write to the system
memory. One way of doing this is to use a cheap FPGA board designed for peripheral
device development and load it with logic that keeps sending coherent DMA requests
to the targeted memory address.
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• Attack before cache warm up. Most of the attacks and exploits can be launched at
the very beginning of application execution. Since the cache has not been warmed
up, tampered program execution will leave desired memory footprint in this case.
7.2 Authentication Architecture
It is not the objective of this chapter to discuss how to design or choose a MAC standard
for integrity protection. This issue has been addressed in a number of recent publications
[63, 62]. The main focus of this chapter is to investigate different schemes of integrating
integrity verification logic or unit into an out-of-order processor pipeline. In this section, we
will provide detailed information how to tie authentication result with instruction execution
and discuss the security and performance implications of each method in the context of
memory fetch side-channel exploits. We treat the specific MAC verification logic as a black
box that for each piece of fetched data returns a binary verification result.
7.2.1 Authentication Queue
Figure 47 is a block diagram of an out-of-order processor pipeline augmented with integrity
verification and cryptographic capabilities. For every block of code or data fetched from
memory, the secure processor decrypts the information and verifies its integrity. There are
two main reasons contributing to the latency disparity between decryption and authenti-
cation. First, secure processor can use encryption modes such as the counter mode that
allows pre-computation and prediction [57] to reduce overall fetch-decryption latency while
integrity verification can not be started until the data is fetched or decrypted. Second,
in addition to regular MAC verification, the secure processor may also employ MAC tree
or Merkel hash tree to prevent replay attacks, which further increases the authentication
latency. We assume that authentication or integrity verification in general is falling behind
decryption with latency from tens to hundred of clock cycles. For each fetched block of data
or code, the secure processor sends a request to a component, called authentication queue.
The integrity verification unit authenticates data in the request order and broadcasts the
authentication result. Since each request is associated with a queue entry, the entry index






































Figure 47: Secure Processor Block Diagram
Register” that points to the index of the most recent authentication request.
7.2.2 Authentication Architecture
In this subsection, we will explore four designs that connect integrity verification result with
instruction execution.
7.2.2.1 Authentication-then-issue
Authentication-then-issue is a conservative approach. According to authentication-then-
issue only after integrity verification, fetched instructions can be issued and fetched data
can be used as operand. This approach is simple to implement and it prevents all the runtime
95
Table 7: Comparison of Security Strength of Different Schemes Against Side-channel Dis-
close








√ √ √ √
exploits of the aforementioned side-channel. However, it buys security at a significant cost
on performance because in this case integrity verification is on the critical path.
7.2.2.2 Authentication-then-write
Authentication-then-write is the most optimistic of the four approaches. According to
authentication-then-write, integrity of memory state is guaranteed if for every piece of data
written to the memory, the secure processor is certain that the data is generated based on
the verified code and data. Detailed implementation of this approach may vary.
In one implementation, for every store instruction, when the instruction is ready for
issue, the secure processor will read the ”LastRequest Register” and associate the index
value as a tag of the store instruction, called ”authentication tag”. The store value that
should be written to either L1 cache or memory will remain in the store queue until it
receives a broadcast result that indicates that the authentication request referenced by
the store value’s authentication tag has been successfully verified. This ensures that the
secure processor only updates cache and memory with values produced by the verified
code and data. Note that the authentication engine broadcasts verification result in the
natural request order. Upon receipt of a broadcasted matching authentication tag, the
secure processor can be certain that all the codes and data before the waiting store are also
authenticated.
Under authentication-then-write, the secure processor guarantees that at any moment,
the information stored in the memory can be trusted in the sense that they are produced
based on the authenticated code and data. However, this approach does not prevent any
of the aforementioned active exploits of memory fetch side-channels. It does not guarantee
confidential software and data from being disclosed through the side-channel exploits.
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Table 8: Characteristic Comparison of Different Schemes
prevent active precise authenticated 1 authenticated 2










√ √ √ √
plus authentication-then-commit
7.2.2.3 Authentication-then-commit
In an out-of-order processor design, instructions wait in a structure called reorder buffer
before they are committed. According to authentication-then-commit, the secure processor
will not commit an instruction until both the instruction itself and its operands are authenti-
cated. In some aspects, authentication-then-commit is similar to authentication-then-write.
For example, Authentication-then-commit also guarantees that the secure processor only
updates the memory states using authenticated code and data. However, there are many
sometimes fundamental differences between these two approaches. First, authentication-
then-write deals with only memory state, sometimes only the external memory state while
authentication-then-commit handles both memory state and processor state. Second, Authentication-
then-commit provides precise interrupt for authentication exceptions while authentication-
then-write does not. Though seemingly a very promising design, authentication-then-commit
does not prevent any of the aforementioned memory fetch side-channel exploits because it
allows unverified memory fetches to be speculatively issued.
7.2.2.4 Authentication-then-fetch
According to authentication-then-fetch, a secure processor must not grant bus cycles to an
external memory fetch until both the fetch instruction or branch instruction and the fetch
address are authenticated. In addition, strong authentication-then-fetch requires not only
the fetch/branch instruction or the fetch address itself be authenticated but also all the codes
and data that the fetch/branch instruction and the fetch address depend on. This includes
1Memory state updated based on authenticated code and data
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Figure 48: Timeline of Authentication-then-fetch vs. Authentication-then-issue
both control and data dependency. To reach a particular data fetch or branch instruction,
there is an execution path, also called program slice, that includes all the previous dependent
instructions. According to strong authentication-then-fetch, a secure processor is allowed to
issue fetch address on the front side bus only if 1) the data fetch/branch instruction itself
is authenticated; 2) all the previous instructions it has control and data dependency are
authenticated; 3) the fetch address itself or all the data for deriving the fetch address if the
fetch address is computed are authenticated. In another word, all the instructions and data
involved in the path or slice have to be authenticated before the fetch is issued to the front
side bus.
A precise implementation of this approach requires dynamic tracking of control and
data dependency that may be too complex. Fortunately, there are many alternative imple-
mentations that sufficiently satisfy all the requirements of authentication-then-fetch without
resorting to dependency tracking. In one variation, memory fetch is not issued until the
secure processor drains the authentication queue. This is called drain-authentication-then-
fetch. For a new memory fetch, the secure processor stops sending more authentication
requests to the authentication queue, waits for the current authentication to be drained,
issues the memory fetch afterward, and then resumes sending more authentication requests.
Alternatively, a secure processor may associate the current value of the ”LastRequest Reg-
ister” with each issued instruction. If the instruction triggers a memory fetch, the fetch
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is stalled until the authentication queue has completed authentication of the associated
request. Figure 48 uses an example to illustrate the difference between authentication-
then-issue and authentication-then-fetch. The example shows two external memory fetches
where the second fetch is based on the first fetch. There is an assumed fixed latency between
when the data/instruction based on the first fetch result is issued to the processor pipeline
and when the second fetch address is ready. The dotted line highlights the time difference
between the two schemes and shows the latency advantage of authentication-then-fetch over
authentication-then-issue. Note that under authentication-then-fetch, new external memory
fetches only stall on already issued recently decrypted instructions or operands. Instructions
or data that are decrypted after the new memory fetch is created, or outstanding external
memory fetches will have no latency impact on the new memory fetch.
Table 7 summarizes and compares five authentication architectures in term of their
security strength against the four mentioned runtime exploits of fetch address side-channel.
According to the comparison, authentication-then-issue and authentication-then-fetch are
the most secure authentication architectures. Table 8 provides additional comparison of dif-
ferent authentication architecture in more aspects. It is recommended that authentication-
then-fetch be used together with authentication-then-commit to quarantine authenticated
memory/ processor state and achieve precise interrupt on security faults.
7.3 Performance Analysis
7.3.1 Simulation Framework
Our simulation work is based on SimpleScalar [6] running Alpha binaries compiled with -03
option. Each benchmark is fast-forwarded according to SimPoint’s suggestion [56] and then
simulated for 400 million instructions in performance mode. During fast-forwarding, L1 and
L2 caches were warmed up. Table 7.3.1 summaries the architectural and microarchitectural
parameters.
Eighteen SPEC2000 INT and FP benchmarks with high L2 misses and memory through-
put requirements were used for evaluation.
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L1 I-Cache DM, 16KB, 32B line
L1 D-Cache DM, 16KB, 32B line
L2 Cache 4way, Unified, 64B line, write back cache
256KB and 1M
L1/L2 Latency 1 cycle / 4 cycles (256KB), 8 cycles (1M)
RUU 128, 64 entries
Memory Bus 200MHz, 8B wide
Memory Latency X-5-5-5 (core clocks)
X depends on page status
CAS latency 20 mem bus clocks
Precharge latency (RP) 7 mem bus clocks
RAS-to-CAS (RCD) latency 7 mem bus clocks
Triple-DES latency 96ns, 48 stages
AES latency 80ns
7.3.2 Implementation
The latency of decryption and integrity verification varies substantially depending on many
factors such as encryption mode, cipher, authentication scheme, process technology, ar-
chitecture design and etc. To best justify our performance conclusions, we use reference
implementations. In simulation study, we conduct sensitivity study to capture different
variations and design scenarios.
Integrity verification based on MAC is often standard operation. But variation of dif-
ferent MAC approaches can have significant impact on verification latency. Though it is
plausible to carry out integrity verification and decryption concurrently, unlike counter
mode, integrity verification must wait until the data is fetched. Furthermore, integrity ver-
ification has to be conducted on the entire data block. As a result, latency of integrity
verification is often longer than decryption. In the reference implementation, we use stan-
dard HMAC [34] for protecting integrity of data blocks stored in the external RAM. The
default size of MAC is 64 bits. The reference HMAC uses standard SHA-256 algorithm
[50]. Simulation study is based on Verilog implementation of SHA-256 [64], synthesized
using Synopsys. This design is totally asynchronous and has a gate count of 19,000 gates.
The latency for this design is 74ns for 512 bits of padded input (padding with the required
padding in SHA-256).
In addition to per-data block based integrity verification, secure processor sometimes
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also applies a hash tree or MAC tree for preserving the overall memory space integrity and
preventing replay attacks of data blocks. This causes substantially additional amount of
latency overhead. The CHTree scheme in [62] constructs an m-ary hash tree where m is
the number of child nodes per parent node has and is equal to the size of the cache line
divided by the size of hash values. A typical value of m is 4. To verify a data block, it
takes logm(L) hashing computations, assuming the entire memory space comprising L total
data blocks. The reference implementation uses a m-ary MAC tree instead of hash tree for
improved performance and security. A default value of m is either 4 or 8. This means that
a new MAC is calculated over every 4 or 8 MACs. Recursively, each node of the MAC tree
is a MAC of 4 or 8 child MACs. On top of the MAC tree is a root MAC of 64 bits. The
root MAC is a signature of the entire memory space of a software application.
7.3.3 Performance Result
In this section we summarize performance results. The results are collected on two L2 cache
settings, 256K and 1M.
7.3.3.1 Performance of Different Authentication Architectures
Figure 49 shows normalized IPC of the five ways of using authentication result under
256K L2 for eighteen SPEC2000 integer and floating benchmarks. The IPC is normalized
against IPC of a baseline situation of decryption only without integrity verification. The
results suggest that authentication-then-issue have the worst performance where the average
IPC is about 87% of the baseline IPC. For some benchmarks such as ammp, bzips, mgrid,
twolf, and vpr, their IPCs are below 80% of the their respective baseline IPCs. In contrast,
authentication-then-write has the best performance. On average, IPC under authentication-
then-write is more than 98% of the baseline IPC, which means less than 2% performance
penalty. The next one is authentication-then-commit, its average IPC is more than 96% of
the baseline IPC. For most benchmarks, IPC under this scheme is over 90% of the baseline
IPC except mgrid whose normalized IPC is 86%. Under authentication-then-fetch, the
average IPC is 92% of the baseline IPC. Combination of authentication-then-commit and




























































































































































































Figure 51: Comparison of IPC Speedup Over Authentication-then-issue Using Three Other
Schemes, 256K L2
Figure 50 shows normalized IPC performance under 1M L2 cache. Since there are
less amount of memory accesses when the L2 size quadruples, the performance impact of
different schemes is less than the scenario of 256K L2. However, the performance ranking
of the five schemes is the same where authentication-then-issue has the lowest performance
and authentication-then-write has the highest performance.
As aforementioned, authentication-then-issue is the most secure scheme. Figure 51
compares authentication-then-commit, authentication-then-write, and authentication-then-
commit plus authentication-then-fetch with authentication-then-issue by showing the IPC
speedup of the three schemes over IPC of authentication-then-issue. The results indicate
that on average, authentication-then-commit improves IPC by 12%. For four benchmarks,
the improvement is over 20% and for other six benchmarks, the improvement is in the
range from 10% to 20%. Three benchmarks have performance speedup over 30%. For
authentication-then-write, the performance improvement on average is about 14%. How-

























































Figure 52: IPC Speedup of Authentication-then-commit Over Authentication-then-issue
Under Three Authentication Latencies, 256K L2
are less secure than authentication-then-issue. In contrast, combination of authentication-
then-commit and authentication-then-fetch provides much better security and it does not
suffer from the aforementioned exploits just like authentication-then-issue. For five bench-
marks, authentication-then-commit plus authentication-then-fetch provides about 10% per-
formance improvement over authentication-then-issue.
Figure 52 shows that when the latency overhead of authentication increases, the per-
formance improvement of authentication-then-commit over authentication-then-issue. As
expected, when the authentication latency goes up, IPC speedup of authentication-then-
commit over authentication-then-issue also increases.
7.3.3.2 RUU Size
Under authentication-then-commit, completed instructions will wait for authentication re-
sult before they are committed. Size of RUU may have some impact on performance of
the studied schemes. To conduct sensitivity study, we reduce the number of RUU entries

























































































































Figure 54: Comparison of IPC Speedup Over Authentication-then-issue Under Different




























































Figure 55: Normalized IPC Under Different Authentication Schemes, Memory Authenti-
cation Tree
The performance rank of four schemes from the lowest to the highest are, authentication-
then-issue, authentication-then-commit plus authentication-then-fetch, authentication-then-
commit, and authentication-then-write. Figure 54 shows IPC speedup of authentication-
then-commit and authentication-then-commit plus authentication-then-fetch over authentication-
then-issue. For five benchmarks, authentication-then-commit plus authentication-then-fetch
has performance improvement about 10%. For ten benchmarks, authentication-then-commit
improves IPC in the range from 10% to 50%.
7.3.3.3 Impact of Hash Tree Authentication
Hash or MAC tree can prevent replay attacks. One side-effect of using hash or MAC tree
such as the CHTree approach is the additional latency overhead for integrity verification.
We evaluate the five schemes under hash tree authentication. The hash tree implemen-
tation is based on [62]. Our implementation conducts verification of the internal hash
tree nodes concurrently when it is allowed. Authenticated and verified tree nodes are



























































Figure 56: Comparison of IPC Speedup Over Authentication-then-issue, Memory Authen-
tication Tree
is 8KB. Figure 55 shows the normalized IPC performance of authentication-then-issue,
authentication-then-commit and authentication-then-commit plus authentication-then-fetch.
Again, the performance results indicate the same ranking of performance among the three
schemes. Figure 56 shows performance improvement of authentication-then-commit and
authentication-then-commit plus authentication-then-fetch over authentication-then-issue.
For authentication-then-commit, seven benchmarks have performance improvement from
10% to 35%. For authentication-then-commit plus authentication-then-fetch, five bench-
marks have performance improvement more than 10%.
7.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose and explore design spectrum of integrating memory integrity ver-
ification and decryption into an out-or-order high performance processor pipeline to provide
a secure computing environment. The chapter provides in-depth analysis of the risk associ-
ated with memory fetch side-channel in the context of secure processor design. It analyzes
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and evaluates the security implications of several design choices including authentication-
then-issue, authentication-then-commit, authentication-then-write, authentication-then-fetch.
Based on both security analysis and performance evaluation, we show that authentication-
then-issue provides the best protection against the side-channel exploits but has he most
performance overhead. Authentication-then-write guarantees the integrity of processing re-
sults stored in un-trusted external memory. In addition, authentication-then-commit ensures
the integrity of both memory and processor state at any moment and achieves precise inter-
rupt for security exceptions. But neither approach prevents violation of software and data
confidentiality through runtime exploit of memory fetch side-channel. Among all the eval-
uated techniques, combination of authentication-then-fetch and authentication-then-commit
attains best trade-off between security and performance. Authentication-then-fetch protects
against runtime exploits of the memory fetch side-channel and at the same time incurs
only moderate performance degradation. In conclusion, analysis and result of this chapter




PROTECTION OF MEMORY FOR SYMMETRIC
MULTI-PROCESSORS
Most secure processor solutions proposed so far assume that the system memory is exclu-
sively ”owned” by one processing element (often the main processor). Inside the processor,
memory is authenticated on per process basis with a memory integrity signature computed
for each process’s virtual space. This signature is generally the root of an authentication
tree such as MACTree or CHTree discussed in chapter 7.2. This kind of strong process
isolation prevents the signature from being shared by multiple processors. When inter-
processor memory sharing is inevitable, a copy from one processor’s authenticated domain
to another’s is required. Such copying operations often require duplicated integrity check-
ing of the shared memory by the destination processor. For symmetric multiprocessor
(SMP) systems, it is not a trivial task to synchronize and maintain integrity signatures
for frequently shared data without significantly degrading system performance. To make
things even harder, integrity protection of memory shared among multiple processors has
to prevent eavesdrop or replay attacks on the shared bus or the system memory interface.
In this chapter, we describe a fast and low overhead solution to authenticate the shared
memory of a SMP system. Through securing every component along the path from a
computing device to another computing device or the commonly shared memory, a chain
of integrity protection is constructed. The chained authentication scheme is capable of
preventing most software based and hardware based exploits on the memory system and the
shared data path among processors. The scheme also optionally provides high performance
protection on information confidentiality for shared data.
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8.1 Challenges in Shared Memory Protection
In this section, we discuss many basic issues associated with shared memory protection at
high level. It presents the basic platform architecture our solution is targeted for. It also
shows the types of attacks our solution is aimed to prevent and detect.
Efficiency and Security: Almost all the recently proposed security computing plat-
forms with hardware-based memory protections assume that everything in such a system
is insecure except the main processor with built-in security support [73, 37, 61]. Under
such assumptions, many proposed protection solutions often have all the hardware security
features such as memory decryption and integrity verification implemented in the main
processor. Gassend et al. [22], the CHTree authentication scheme constructs a m-ary hash
tree for protecting the memory integrity of an application process under a uni-processor
environment. As shown, CHTree slows down the execution by around 20% with a 2MB L2
and incurs 33% memory space overhead. The LHash scheme in [60] was proposed to im-
prove the authentication speed. This scheme logs memory operations and performs integrity
checks only when a large number of memory operations is accumulated. As discussed in
chapter 7, aggressive disassociation between integrity verification and memory decryption
may cause significant security risk. How to protect confidentiality and integrity of SMP
shared memory remains a great challenge.
Multiprocessor Domain: Furthermore, most existing secure processor architectures
are designed for uni-processor memory protection and assume that the security boundary
lies at the interface between a secure processor and its system bus. Such a centralized view
fits with a uni-processor platform but does not apply to a SMP system. A simple way to
extend the existing solutions to the SMP scenario is to have a separate copy of the memory
for each processing element1 (PE) and have the secure OS to copy the data from one trusted
domain to another using protected message passing mechanism whenever needed. This will
however significantly increase the delay of inter-processor communication and substantially
undermines performance of SMP applications.
1A processing element (PE) can be a core processor, a co-processor, or a peripheral in a uni-processor



























































Figure 57: MP platform
Replay Attacks: One of the major challenges of designing a secure SMP platform is
how to prevent and detect replay attacks. There are two types of replay attacks: 1) replay
logged bus transactions, including both the cache-to-cache and the memory-to-cache bus
transactions; 2) replay information stored in the physical RAM. Under the system where
the memory is exclusively owned by a single PE (i.e. core processor), replay attack can be
prevented using MACTree or CHTree inside the PE. But such solutions do not apply when
the shared memory can be updated by multiple PEs. If each PE maintains its own integrity
verification tree, to verify and synchronize the root signatures of these authentication trees
across multiple processors could be cumbersome and lead to significant performance impact
on frequent inter-processor communication.
Distributing Secrets: Another challenge of designing a tamper-proof SMP system
is how to distribute and share secret information among processors and devices. Such
shared information may include symmetric cryptographic keys, shared sequence number,
etc. Distributing and sharing secrets is a unique problem to SMP shared memory protection.
In summary, shared memory authentication is a unique problem. To enable a fast,
secure, and unified solution for authenticating shared memory, we propose a distributed
scheme where both the main processor(s) and the chipset contribute to create a secure
environment for trusted software execution. Our shared memory authentication scheme is
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universal for both SMP shared memory systems and uni-processor systems with a memory
shared by a core processor and other peripherals/agents.
Instead of having each PE to use its own MACTree, our solution enables shared memory
protection through a centralized MACTree implemented in the memory system with a secure
SMP coherent bus protocol. The shared memory protection is achieved by securing the data
path from each PE to the shared system memory. With the MACTree embedded in the
North Bridge (i.e. the memory controller), the data path between the memory controller and
the physical RAM is secured. Moreover, the secure SMP bus protocol provides a trusted and
authenticated environment for both cache-to-cache and memory-to-cache bus transactions.
Untrusted devices cannot commit any bus transaction to the protected shared memory and
any attempt to replay past authenticated bus transactions can also be detected. Since both
the data path from each PE to the system memory and the data paths among PEs are
protected, secure and authenticated sharing of the system memory is provided. Different
from the previous approaches that put all the hardware resources for memory protection
into one single secure processor, our solution provides a trusted environment for SMP shared
memory through securing the platform.
8.2 Security Model for Shared Memory
In this section, we present the detailed security model and architectural support for shared
memory authentication. We only focus on symmetric multiprocessor (SMP) systems where
a coherent snoopy bus and a large physical RAM are shared by a number of processors. It is
straightforward to extend the solution to situations where each processor maintains a local
memory. The proposed SMP shared memory protection scheme can be used to ensure both
integrity and confidentiality for SMP shared memory. We first present a SMP platform
oriented security model, then, architectural supports for the security model.
8.2.1 Multiprocessor Security Model
Figure 57 shows target architecture of SMP systems. A split-transaction, cache coherent
system bus connects each processor to the shared memory. The security model holds no
specific assumptions about the coherent bus protocol, neither is it tied to any particular
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SMP system. Examples of applicable SMP systems include SGI’s POWERpath-2, Alpha’s
SMP protocol, and Intel Xeon based SMP systems. To simplify the discussion, the scheme
to be presented uses a split-transaction, SGI Powerpath-2 like cache-coherency protocol [21].
Applying the scheme to other SMP system should be straightforward with little changes.
The shaded blocks in the system are trusted and protected components. The dark stars
denote points of potential attacks.
The proposed security model provides a system level specification for constructing a
trusted environment for SMP software execution. It addresses four issues — management
of protected SMP processes, distribution and sharing of secrets, protection on integrity and
secrecy, and software distribution. The security model assumes the existence of a secure
OS kernel [22]. A secure OS kernel is a set of trusted core OS services. These services are
executed in a trusted domain. The secure kernel is verified by a secure BIOS during system
boot [5].
8.2.1.1 Process Control
One basic and essential protection on a multi-tasking system is process or task isolation.
Different process should not be allowed to access other processes’ protected domain. To
achieve process isolation, two conditions must be satisfied. First, each process must be
uniquely identified. Second, unique per-process cryptographic information must be used for
protecting integrity and confidentiality of each process’s memory. The traditional process
id (pid) is not a good choice because the likelihood of reusing a pid is very high. Here
we define a unique 128-bit number, process uuid, a universal unique identifier to uniquely
identify a process. The process uuid is obtained from a random number generator. The
process uuid itself is not considered as secret and can be securely shared among multiple
processors during initialization by the secure kernel. Process uuid is treated as process
context and is protected against tampering during context switch.
Secret padding and keys used for authenticating or encrypting memory information
of each process is derived from each process’ uuid. A new privileged instruction which
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(b) Integrity Code Generation (Integrity Key and Bus Se-
quence Number generation are described in figure 60)






Figure 58: Security Operations on Each Cache Block Evicted from Processor or Transmit-
ted as Coherence Miss
Execution of the instruction includes several steps. One step involves that the processor
assigns the process uuid to an internal uuid register and computes a process key as described
in figure 58(a). The session key shown in the figure is created at boot time and described
in detail in Section 8.2.1.3. Secret Constant is an initial value, same for all Processing
Elements (PE’s) and known only to each PE and the secure memory controller. Other
steps of the instruction set uuid are described later in section Section 8.2.2.2. relate to how
the process uuid is shared by other devices attached to the shared bus.
8.2.1.2 Integrity and Confidentiality Protection
Message authentication code (MAC) is a well established technique for guaranteeing data
integrity by verifying whether a piece of received or retrieved data was tampered during
transmission or storage. For the purpose of memory integrity protection and authentication,
before a PE stores a chunk of data to the insecure memory, it will compute an integrity code
using a MAC generation algorithm and keep it alongside the data. In the case of digital
rights protection or secure software execution, the data itself may or may not be encrypted
depending on the security requirement. Later, when the same PE or any other PE attempts
to access the data, the integrity of the data will be verified by re-generating the integrity
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code of the retrieved data using the same MAC algorithm and comparing it against the
stored one. Any tampering to the stored data will be detected when a mismatch occurs.
In our shared memory authentication scheme, each PE (including the North Bridge)
is responsible for computing the integrity code for data to be stored to the memory or
requested by other PEs. When the data is shared by multiple PEs, the key along with other
necessary information for generating/verifying the integrity code must be shared among
all the involved PEs. The integrity code is encrypted when it is transmitted through the
shared system bus. A counter mode class encryption pad is uniquely computed using a
confidential shared bus sequence number which is tracked by all the PEs on the system
bus. The sequence number is incremented by all the devices attached to the system bus
after each bus transaction. For protecting confidentiality of either information stored to
the memory and coherence response to other processor’s request, the data is also encrypted
using encryption pads computed based on the shared bus sequence number.
Figure 58 shows needed operations for a cache block that is either dirty-evicted from
the protected domain or requested by other processors. The operations illustrated are
conducted by a PE on each protected cache block to be written to the system bus. They
involve, generation of the process key using the process uuid (figure 58(a)), generation of the
encrypted integrity code using the generated process key, bus sequence number, the data
to be written and the integrity key (figure 58(b)) and finally encryption of the data using
the bus sequence number and the process key (figure 58(c)). SHA256 [50] and AES128 [20]
are hash and encryption standards. Integrity key is a 256-bit secret shared by the units
attached to the shared system bus. Session key is an AES key uniquely initialized every time
after the system is started. Distribution of the shared secrets such as the sequence number
and the session key is addressed in Section 8.2.1.3. For two blocks next to each other in the
figures implies they are concatenated. The ⊕ stands for XOR. Both the integrity key and
the sequence number are hidden from software access and can not be accessed externally.
Similarly, computed data such as integrity code and the process key are also hidden from
software access. Only encrypted integrity codes and encrypted cache blocks are observable
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Figure 59: Security Operations on Each Cache Block Received
which are burnt inside each PE. Most of the shared secrets, such as the session key, the
integrity key, and the sequence number are not fixed constants. They are uniquely assigned
each time after the system is booted using approaches described in Section 8.2.1.3.
Integrity verification and decryption of received cache block (coherence reply and mem-
ory read) are shown in figure 59. Reading involves, computation of the process key (fig-
ure 59(a)), decrypting the received encrypted integrity code and encrypted data using the
process key (figure 59(b) and figure 59(c)) and finally recomputing the integrity code from
the decrypted data to compare with the received integrity code for authentication (fig-
ure 59(d)).
The security model shown in figure 58 and figure 59 minimizes the performance critical
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path between encryption and decryption. The encryption OTP is pre-computed. In the
best scenario, the interval of transferring an encrypted cache block consists of only time
of a XOR operation on the sender, transmission delay, and another XOR operation on the
receiver. Integrity check requires much more time because integrity code has to be computed
before transmission and verified after the cache block is received.
8.2.1.3 Secrets Distribution and Sharing
How to securely distribute and share secret such as the keys, the padding, the sequence
number, and etc., is a major challenge for designing a secure distributed system. Obviously,
the secret can not be broadcast as plaintext over the system bus. Integrity of the shared
secret also has to be maintained so that it can not be forged. Furthermore, the shared secret
such as the session keys, the sequence number must be different each time the machine is
rebooted to prevent replay attack.
Similar to a regular symmetric multiprocessor system, one processor has to be designated
as the boot processor to bring up the system. This processor will execute its secure BIOS and
boot into a secure OS. The uniqueness of our solution is that the shared secrets themselves
are not transmitted, instead they are computed by each involved processor in a secure way
based on information that can be openly shared.
During boot time, the bootstrap processor broadcasts the range of physical memory to
be protected to all the processing units and the memory controller. It could be a portion
of the entire physical address space or all the physical RAM space. After that, it starts
key generation. During key generation, each unit attached to the shared bus is granted
bus cycles in turn to broadcast a random 64-bit number. Then each unit concatenates all
the random numbers it collects from the bus including the one it broadcasts and computes
a hash value using some hash function. The hash result is truncated into a 128-bit AES
session key. Then, all the shared secrets including the shared bus sequence number, the
process key, the integrity key are all synchronously computed based on the session key as
shown in figure 60.
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Figure 60: Processor Initialization and Distribution of Shared Secrets
the processor chip, and the memory controller during manufacturing. They are secrets
stored in the chip inaccessible by either software running inside or any device from outside.
After a device creates all the required keys and numbers, it will enter a synchronization
barrier. After all the devices on the shared bus complete key generation and enter the syn-
chronization barrier, regular bus and memory transaction are resumed with the appropriate
protection specified in this chapter.
The session key and bus sequence number are not tied to a particular process and are not
considered part of a process context. But a process is free to specify whether segments/pages
of its virtual memory should be mapped to the protected physical memory. Note that a
different session key is generated each time after the system is freshly rebooted.
8.2.1.4 Software Distribution and Platform Key
The cryptographic protection proposed is ”self-contained” because the session key, the root
of all the keys, the sequence number, etc, are not constants and will be modified each time
118
after reboot. Software vendors are not able to generate the integrity code or encryption
pads used in the protection because they do not have the session key. To execute software
either encrypted or authenticated by vendors in the mode with the proposed protection,
conversion from the vendor protected domain to the SMP platform protected domain is
required. This is achieved through a platform key. A platform key is a pair of public-
private keys with private key permanently burnt into the SMP’s chipset. Vendors encrypt
the symmetric cryptographic key used to encrypt/authenticate a software with the public
platform keys. When the software is copied to memory from its disk image, it will be
decrypted, authenticated using the keys set by the software vendors, and then re-encrypted
using the methods described in figure 58 and figure 59. As we will describe next, this
conversion does not necessarily require processor involvement and can be performed in high
speed with security enabled DMA engines.
8.2.2 Architectural Support of SMP Security
In this section, we present a detailed architecture model for implementing the SMP security
model described in the previous section. There are three security enabled platform architec-
ture components, the shared system bus, the memory controller, and the secure processors.
Extra security related functionality has to be added to these components to support the
proposed SMP security model. Furthermore, new techniques must be invented to mini-
mize the performance impact of security verification. For SMP systems and benchmarks,
integrity verification is a significant performance influencing factor because integrity code
of coherent response of cache-to-cache communication has to be computed, transmitted,
re-computed, and verified. To tolerate the latency of integrity checking, we propose two
new techniques. First, we propose a split transaction bus model for data and its integrity
code. Second, we use secure decryption and authentication disassociation described in 7
to further hide the latency of integrity checking.
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8.2.2.1 Secure Symmetric Coherent Bus Protocol
The purpose of the secure multiprocessor bus protocol is to prevent spoof and replay attack
on the shared coherent SMP bus. It plays an essential role for providing a chain of authen-
tications for both cache-to-cache and memory-to-cache accesses. Although the principle of
how we secure the SMP bus is in fact not tied to any SMP coherence bus protocol, but for
the sake of discussion, we restrict the design to a four-state coherence protocol similar to
SGI POWERpath-2 with cache-to-cache transfer triggering a write-back to memory. Each
cache has four states; invalid, exclusive, dirty exclusive, and shared. Each transition be-
tween states is either initiated by the processor or by a coherent transaction. A duplicate
set of cache tags [21] is maintained by each processor interface ASIC and bus arbitration
is done in distributed manner. Similar to POWERpath-2, every bus transaction requires
five clock cycles. A system wide bus controller logic executes the same five-state machine
synchronously: arbitration, resolution, address, decode, and acknowledge.
All the devices on the shared multiprocessor bus including the memory controller share
the same secret 64-bit bus transaction sequence number described in figure 58 and figure 59.
Since all the bus transactions are visible to all the units attached to the snoopy SMP bus,
it is straightforward for a unit on the bus to update and keep track of the sequence number.
After a bus transaction completes, every unit on the bus increments its copy of the sequence
number internally. The sequence number is initialized during system boot as shown in
figure 60. The number is kept as secret by all the involved devices and never transmitted
in either plaintext or ciphertext on the bus.
One unique performance feature of our secure bus is the split transaction of data and
its integrity code. We may infer from figure 58 and figure 59, that integrity code generation
and verification is the critical path of the SMP security model. To minimize the impact
of authentication on performance, our secure bus model allows data block and its integrity
code transmitted separately. For coherent response, a cache block can be transmitted
first followed by the encrypted integrity code after it is computed. The unverified data
will be used by the processor pipeline of the destination processor speculatively under the










received and verified, completed instructions using the unverified data can be retired and
stalled memory fetches can be issued.
Note that the 64-bit bus sequence is good enough for security protection. This is because
for a bus running at speed of hundreds of MHz or a few GHz, it would take hundreds of
years if not thousands for a 64-bit sequence number to wrap-around.
8.2.2.2 Secure Memory System
This section describes the architecture of the secure memory system consisting of a memory
controller with an integrated security engine, and a number of physical RAM chips. It is
worth mentioning that integrity code alone is not sufficient for memory integrity protection
because an adversary can replace a piece of current data and its MAC with some old stale
data and MAC. Such replay exploit cannot be detected without using techniques such as
MACTree.
The primary goal of the security engine embedded in the North Bridge memory controller
is to detect tampering or replay of data stored in the system memory. It is another critical
component in the chain of shared memory authentications. A simple solution is to have
either Merkle hash tree or MACTree implemented in the memory controller. Note that the
integrity code itself is not transmitted in plaintext over the SMP bus and is unknown to
the hackers. Organization of the MACTree is shown in figure 61. A leaf node represents an
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individual integrity code and each internal node denotes a MAC of all the children nodes.
The detailed operation of a memory write is as follows. After the integrity of received
data is verified, the memory controller will update the MACTree by substituting the new
integrity code (after it is XORed with the integrity encryption pad) into the tree. Then it
will send the data with the encrypted integrity code to the memory. To be able to verify
the integrity code later, the memory controller will also store the encrypted bus sequence
number to the memory. Each bus sequence number can be encrypted using AES as shown
in figure 62. Both the NB MAC key and the NB E key (where NB stands for North Bridge
and E stands for encryption) used during encryption are secret information maintained by
the North Bridge itself.
To improve performance, the bus sequence numbers of frequent data blocks can be
cached inside the North Bridge or speculated using the counter prediction technique de-
scribed in chapter 4.
Upon receipt of a read request, the memory controller will fetch both the data and the
associated encrypted integrity code from the physical RAM. The corresponding encrypted
bus sequence number will also be retrieved if it is not cached in the North Bridge. The au-
thentication mechanism will extract the original integrity code using the approach detailed
in figure 59. To verify whether the integrity code and the data is a replay, it is inserted into
the MACTree. Starting from the bottom of the tree, recursively, a new MAC is computed
and compared with the cached internal MACTree node. If a match is found, the integrity
code is verified valid. Since it is impractical to cache all the internal nodes of the MACTree,
some internal MACTree nodes will be stored in the insecure system memory and brought
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into the memory controller when needed. To prevent from leaking sensitive information and
jeopardizing security, confidentiality of the internal MACTree node has to be maintained.
This is achieved by encrypting the internal MACTree node using 128-bit AES encryption
scheme.
The aforementioned security operations introduces additional latency overhead to the
critical path of fetching data from the shared memory. A number of design and architectural
optimizations are proposed to address the latency overhead of security protection.
• The integrity encryption pad and data encryption pad are pre-computed. Since the bus
sequence number always increments, each PE can speculatively pre-compute a number
of encryption pads ahead of the current bus sequence number and store the result pads
in a small buffer.
• To speed up the process of verifying retrieved integrity code from memory, the North
Bridge can pre-fetch bus sequence number or pre-compute encryption pads if addresses
of future memory accesses can be predicted or speculated.
• The North Bridge can use sequence number speculation as described in chapter 4 to
overlap decryption operations with memory fetch.
• Both the MACTree node or the bus sequence number of frequent data blocks can be
cached to improve memory access speed.
The secure memory controller (North Bridge) is the center of the proposed SMP security
model. In addition to the MACTree, it also shares secrets with other processors on the
shared bus, maintains platform key pairs described in the security model, and transforms
protected information from the software vendor’s domain to the platform’s domain.
The memory controller holds several security oriented registers. Fixed addresses are
assigned to these registers and access to these registers must be performed through protected
bus transactions. First, there is a process uuid register in each processor. During execution
of a set uuid instruction by a secure processor, the processor also issues a secure write
access to the corresponding uuid register in the North Bridge so that a process key can
be derived by the memory controller. Upon receipt of a new uuid value, the memory
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controller computes its version of the current process key based on figure 58. Similar to
the uuid register, there are North Bridge registers assigned for holding software vendor keys
encrypted by the platform’s public key. The North Bridge can extract the vendor keys using
the private platform key. When the vendor keys are enabled, transactions from peripheral
devices such as disks, network devices are first verified or decrypted using the vendor keys
and then converted using the process key and the integrity key understandable by the secure
processors based on figure 58. The platform key pair is permanently burnt in the North
Bridge.
Note that the secure OS kernel always resides in a separately protected memory space.
Access to the secure kernel uses a different process key and set uuid is not needed when
application switches to secure kernel mode. The memory range of the secure kernel is also
maintained by the North Bridge. The uuid registers and encrypted vendor key registers in
the North Bridge reside in the secure kernel memory space. Another important security role
served by the North Bridge is the conversion of memory protection when data is transmitted
from peripherals such as disk to the physical memory. The conversion mechanism supports
both DMA based and processor based memory operations. For DMA, the involved secure
processor initializes both the related uuid register, and the software vendor key register first,
then starts the DMA engine. The memory controller will automatically verify and convert
protections from vendor’s domain to the platform’s domain for every chunk of data written
to the memory. Similarly, when results in the memory are DMAed to the peripherals, they
can be optionally converted back to the software vendor’s domain. Both operations can
be achieved with support of the security DMA engine without increasing workload on the
secure processor.
8.2.3 Security Analysis
This section provides a security analysis for both the SMP bus protocol and the secure
memory system. The objective of SMP shared memory authentication is to prevent unau-
thorized tampering and replay of coherent response and data stored in the shared memory.
There are a number of potential exploits adversaries can try and we will show that none
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of them will succeed in breaking the proposed protection mechanism. First, an adversary
may try to forge the integrity code. This clearly does not work since each PE can verify
the integrity code and the integrity code is generated using a strong cipher. The integrity
key is a secret and it is re-generated after the machine is rebooted. Second, an adversary
may try to replay both data and the associated integrity code on the SMP bus, this will
fail because every bus transaction is protected by a sequence number that does not stay
the same. Third, an adversary may try to do replay attack on the memory. This would
not succeed neither because of the MACTree protection. Moving memory block and its
encrypted MAC around does not work neither because the encrypted MAC is generated
using address as part of the input. Replay data written by a different process will also fail
because the MAC is encrypted by encryption pads generated using a process key that is
unique to each process. Finally, security privileged instructions such as setup uuid can be
only used inside the secure kernel. User program is not allowed to use these instructions
thus preventing spoofing of a process uuid.
8.3 Performance Analysis
8.3.1 Memory overhead
The sequence numbers associated with each cache line size RAM block and the interme-
diate nodes of the MACTree are stored in the shared system RAM. The space needed is
approximately 1/(m-1) of the RAM size with an m-ary balanced MACTree. For example,
for a 256-bit cache line with a 64-bit sequence number and MAC, the RAM overhead is
about 25% of the protected RAM space. Note that the scheme allows only portion of the
whole RAM protected. It is up to the system on how the protected physical memory is
allocated. The caches implemented in the memory controller are MACTree caches for the
MACTree nodes. They are typically small from 32KB to no more than 64KB.
8.3.2 Simulation Environment
For characterizing and evaluating our proposed MP system, we use RSIM [51] as our in-
frastructure to simulate a 4-node MP system. Each node includes a MIPS R10000 like
out-of-order processor, L1, and L2 cache. We modified the simulator to support the SGI
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Table 10: Applications and input parameters
Application Parameters






Table 11: Processor model parameters
Parameters Values
CPU 4-issue per cycle
reorder buffer 64 instructions
load/store queue 64 instructions
L1 cache 8-Kbyte, directly mapped
L2 cache 4-way, Unified, 32B line,
256KB
L1 Latency 1 cycle
L2 Lat (256KB) 3 cycles
Memory Latency X-5-5-5 (cpu cycles)
X depends on mem page status
Memory Bus 200 MHz, 8B wide
SHA-256 Latency 80ns
AES Latency 80ns
MACTree 2Way; 8KB,32KB; 64B line
POWERpath-2 MP coherent bus protocol and a shared main memory. Secure snoopy
bus protocol, memory authentication, and authentication speculative execution are all im-
plemented into the RSIM simulator. To characterize the memory transactions more accu-
rately, we integrated an accurate DRAM model [25] based on the PC SDRAM specification.
SPLASH-2 benchmark suite [71] was used. The SPLASH-2 benchmark applications [71] and
its input parameters use in this study are listed in table 10. table 11 lists the basic processor
configuration parameters used throughout the experiments unless otherwise specified. The
latencies of MACTree caches were obtained using CACTI [69].
8.3.3 Performance
8.3.3.1 Impact of Authentication Approach
Figure 63 compares the performance between authentication-then-issue with that of secure-
speculative -authentication. The figure shows IPC normalized to the baseline2 under two
scenarios, authentication-then-issue, and secure speculative authentication. In authentication-
then-issue, data brought into each processor from the external is not issued for use until its



































Figure 63: Authentication-then-issue vs. Speculative Authentication, 64K MACTree
Cache, Counter Prediction
integrity is verified, while in secure speculative authentication, unverified data is specula-
tively processed under certain security constraints and restrictions - see chapter 7. We ex-
perimented two MP settings, 2P and 4P systems because dual and quad processor platforms
are the most popular choices for today’s commercial workstations. The results were collected
under the simulation configurations that all the shared memory data were encrypted with
MACTree authentication enabled. The size of the MACTree cache is 64KB. The results
indicate that speculative-authentication delivers faster performance than authentication-
then-issue. The average IPC speedup is 15%. For some benchmarks, such as fft, mp3d,
quicksort, the speedup is more than 20%. In general, the speedup under 2P setting is more
significant than the speedup under 4P.
Figure 64 and Figure 65 show two important profiling results of the benchmarks, com-
bined L1/L2 cache misses and proportion of memory references with respect to the total
number of instructions executed. The profile data show that some benchmarks such as
quicksort, radix, and mp3d. are memory bounded applications because they have both
high memory access ratio and relatively high cache miss rates. Results of Figure 64 and

































































































Figure 66: Authentication Performance under Different North Bridge Cache Resources,
Processors=4
8.3.3.2 MACTree Cache
When the share memory is protected with the MACTree integrity verification. The overall
performance would be sensitive to the amount of cache resources in the North Bridge.
Results in figure 66 show the effects of MACTree cache size using IPC normalized to IPC
of an ideal MACTree situation. It compares two MACTree cache settings, 32KB vs. 64KB.
On average, a 64KB MACTree cache can deliver higher normalized IPC than that of 32KB
MACTree cache. The average speedup is about 10%. For certain benchmarks, such as
fft, mp3d, and radix, the speedup is higher than 10%. Comparing with the baseline of
no security, the average normalized IPC under 64K MACTree cache is about 86% of the
baseline condition. For some benchmarks, such as water, sor, the performance degradation
caused by shared memory security protection is less than 5%. For benchmarks fft and radix,
the performance loss is more than 15%. As a general trend, for almost all the benchmarks,
the normalized IPC under 2P setting is often higher than that of 4P setting, which means


























Figure 67: Cache-to-Cache vs. Memory-to-Cache Access
The latency decryption overhead is un-balanced for the cache-to-cache and the memory-
to-cache accesses. For the cache-to-cache access, the overhead is very small because the data
is encrypted and decrypted by two XOR operations given that the decryption pad is pre-
computed. For the memory-to-cache access, the overhead is bigger because the decryption
pad can not be pre-computed. However, the memory controller can start the decryption
process as soon as the request is received using sequence number speculation. Figure 67
gives results showing categorizations of the L2 misses, in which, most of the benchmarks
except for a few like ”radix” show more cache-to-cache accesses than memory accesses. The
behavior of the ”radix” benchmark may be explained by the fact that it actually does a
radix sort on a huge array of non-negative numbers. The huge number of memory accesses
in ”radix” may be explained as capacity misses for the large array. We may also observe
from the figure that cache-to-cache accesses for a four processor system is larger than for
a two processor system. This is because of that for a four processor system there is more


































Figure 68: Counter Prediction vs. No Prediction (MACTree Cache Size=64KB, no counter
cache)
8.3.3.3 Counter Prediction
Counter prediction is implemented in the North Bridge to reduce the overall RAM fetch
latency. Figure 68 compares normalized IPC results between with counter prediction with
without prediction. The non-prediction case does not use any counter cache. As the results
indicated, for all the benchmarks, the counter prediction achieves higher IPC than non-
prediction. The average IPC speedup is close to 30%.
8.3.3.4 MACTree Integrity Verification Disabled
The main purpose of MACTree integrity verification is to detect replay attack. If such an
attack does not pose a major security threat, it can be disabled, which will certainly bring
down the overhead of shared memory protection. Figure 69 shows the performance results
as normalized IPC. With MACTree disabled, the average normalized IPC is about 95%
of the baseline, which means very small amount of performance degradation. For all the
benchmarks, the normalized IPC is over 90%. Again, as discussed before, in most cases, the

































Figure 69: Normalized IPC With MACTree Integrity Verification Disabled
8.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose a unified hardware-based memory protection scheme for both
uni-processor and SMP platforms. Different from the previous endeavors on uni-processor
memory protection, the design achieves memory security in a platform distributed manner




In this thesis, we propose and evaluate a set of silicon based memory security primitives
and services that allow system designers to innovate and experiment with new types of
secure computing systems that take advantages of the improved tamper-proof protection
and enhanced performance over many existing approaches. The proposed memory security
model and secure processor architecture protects digital content and software stored in
un-trusted system memory from both software and simple physical tamper.
The thesis introduces a set of architecture innovations that aim for secure and high per-
formance implementation of the proposed security model and secure processor architecture.
These include,
• High performance and low area overhead design of hardware memory encryption/decryption
units. The thesis compares and evaluates the architecture and performance implications
of several standard encryption modes on memory protection. It addresses the issue
of finding the proper encryption mode that is both secure and efficient. In addition to
evaluating different encryption modes, we optimize memory decryption process by intro-
ducing a couple of unique prediction techniques that can significantly reduce the latency
overhead of fetching encrypted digital information from memory. First, the thesis de-
scribes a prediction technique called OTP prediction/sequence number prediction that
removes much of the latency penalty of fetching “counter mode” encrypted data from
memory. Based on adaptive prediction of memory update frequency, the OTP predic-
tion allows speculative pre-computation of decryption pads and pushes the advantages
of using counter mode for protecting randomly accessed memory to its limit. Second,
the thesis combines “value” prediction and hardware memory cryptography model for
hiding latency overhead of direct encrypted memory without sacrifice of security.
• High performance tamper proof memory integrity verification and authentication. The
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thesis uses a MAC (message authentication code) tree based approach to prevent tam-
per on integrity of digital data or code stored in the physical memory. Comparing
with other similar techniques, our memory authentication approach and implementa-
tion have the following benefits. It requires less area, has faster performance, and at
the same time is secure. Furthermore, the thesis describes in detail the different ap-
proaches of integrating integrity verification with memory decryption under the modern
out-of-order processor architecture. The thesis compares those approaches in terms of
security strength against various attacks, support for precise interrupt, implementation
complexity, and performance.
• A fast and secure means for protecting memory shared in a SMP (symmetric multi-
processor) system. In this thesis, we propose a unique distributed approach that uses
both security enabled processors and a secure memory controller (also called North
Bridge) to provide integrity and confidentiality protection of SMP shared memory. It
includes: 1) an innovative secure multiprocessor bus protocol for authenticating coher-
ent bus transactions; 2)a fast memory authentication approach; and 3) a speculative
integrity verification mechanism to tolerate the latency of memory authentication for
both processor-to-processor and memory-to-processor accesses. The secure authentica-
tion mechanism is not only fast, but also secure, and supports precise interrupts for
security exceptions.
Building a secure system is a never ending challenge. It is impractical to build a max-
imum secure computing system without considering power, area, cost, backward compati-
bility, programmability, usability, etc. The end result is often a compromise among many
diversified sometimes contradictory requirements. The thesis represents a small step toward
solving those issues and paves the road for future research instead of trying to solve all the
problems once-for-all. We envision that real computing systems with strong tamper-proof
support will emerge in future in many areas such as military embedded systems.
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